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ABSTRACT
Sustainable Organization of a Lean Six Sigma Program: A Competing Values Perspective
By
Marilyn Jane Tom
July 2020

Committee Chair:

Dr. Lars Mathiassen

Major Academic Unit:

Doctorate in Business Administration

Lean Six Sigma has been adopted by tens of thousands of organizations as a process
improvement methodology to cut costs, increase efficiencies, and drive shareholder value.
However, the majority of organizations fail to reap the benefits intended by the methodology and
experience challenges in sustaining the Lean Six Sigma program long-term. Although guidance
exists for organizations to successfully implement Lean Six Sigma, there is a dearth of literature
on the inner workings of large-scale organizations as they maintain and sustain long-term Lean
Six Sigma programs. To address this gap, we provide a retrospective in-depth case study of a
Fortune 500 organization, Johnson & Johnson Inc., which has been successful in both
implementing and sustaining Lean Six Sigma for 13 years (from 2002 to 2015). We draw on the
Competing Values Framework developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) to analyze Johnson &
Johnson’s sustainment of its Lean Six Sigma program, referred to internally as the “Process
Excellence” program. A balanced set of competing values signifies organizational effectiveness –
and our findings provide a detailed account of how Johnson & Johnson managed the competing
values of people versus organization, flexibility versus control, and means versus ends throughout
each period of its Lean Six Sigma program lifecycle. We provide examples where the organization
focused on particular competing values in alignment with general guiding principles for Lean Six
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Sigma sustainment, in addition to examples focusing on particular competing values to address
potential root causes of Lean Six Sigma failure. Opportunities for Johnson & Johnson to better
balance each set of competing values are provided as recommendations for potential future revival
of its Process Excellence program – in addition to guidance for leadership team members,
practitioners, and stakeholders in Lean Six Sigma organizations outside of Johnson & Johnson. As
a result, we offer a detailed empirical account of how an enterprise organized, managed, and
sustained its Lean Six Sigma program over a significant period of time; we demonstrate the
application of the Competing Values Framework in the study of a large-scale Lean Six Sigma
organization; and we provide exemplary lessons for leaders and practitioners implementing and
managing process improvement programs within their own organizations.

Keywords: Lean Six Sigma, process improvement, competing values, sustainable organization,
Johnson & Johnson
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I

INTRODUCTION

Lean Six Sigma (LSS) is a business process improvement methodology that has been
adopted by tens of thousands of organizations, saving Fortune 500 companies an estimated $427
billion from 1987 to 20071. Organizations are constantly looking for ways to minimize costs,
streamline their processes, and improve the quality of their products and services to increase
customer satisfaction. How can an organization boost its “bottom line” organically, by reengineering its internal and external processes, and not having to make a significant investment in
research and development? What inefficiencies, bottlenecks, or errors are preventing the
organization from performing at its highest capability and potential? LSS provides a framework
and approach for organizations to address these questions, as well as a strategy for long-term
success.
I.1

History of Lean and Six Sigma
Six Sigma was first initiated by Motorola in the 1980s and attributed to Bill Smith and Dr.

Mikel J. Harry (both employees at Motorola) as co-founders2. Smith and Harry developed the
business process improvement methodology to address the extreme pressures that Motorola was
facing in its pager business from overseas competition, particularly Japan (Antony, Snee, & Hoerl,
2017). The name “Six Sigma” was given to reflect the overall goal in reducing the variation in
process metrics, such that acceptable product defects (or errors) are those limited to falling within
six standard deviations (i.e. six “sigmas”) of the target (Harry & Schroeder, 2000), specifically
three standard deviations above the mean, and three standard deviations below the mean. Stated

1

SixSigma.com, Six Sigma Quality - https://www.sixsigma.com/why-six-sigma/
Quality Digest, Six Sigma Pioneer Mikel Harry Dies at 65 - https://www.qualitydigest.com/inside/six-sigmanews/six-sigma-pioneer-mikel-harry-dies-65-042617.html
2
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another way, a Six Sigma process is one in which less than 3.4 defects occur for every one million
opportunities.
Six Sigma projects follow a prescribed format, with specific tools applied throughout its
five phases of Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control (also referred to as DMAIC as a
whole). It is to be noted that Motorola had initially developed the methodology with only Measure,
Analyze, Improve, and Control, but GE further developed the methodology in the early 2000s and
introduced the important phase of Define (Hoerl, 2001). Within the Define phase, a project team
outlines the problem at-hand, identifies the project goals and objectives, determines the key metrics
to validate success, and outlines the roles and responsibilities of project team members and
stakeholders. The Measure phase establishes the baseline performance of the process by defining
the key metrics, collecting data on the key metrics, and documenting the current process. Within
the Analyze phase, the project team identifies root causes of defects or variation, bottlenecks in
the process, and opportunities for re-sequencing or re-engineering. Potential solutions to address
the root causes and improvement opportunities are identified and tested within the Improve phase,
and process controls are established within the Control phase to sustain the improvement. A
summary of the objectives within each phase of DMAIC are shown below in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: The DMAIC Process (Montgomery, 2008)
The DMAIC phases are not necessarily linear – a project team for example may reach the
Analyze phase and find that the data they initially collected was not sufficient to clearly identify
the root cause(s) of their underperforming process. The team may then need to return to the
Measure phase to identify new metrics to collect data for, revise their data collection process, and
update the overall project timelines based on the additional effort now needed. The DMAIC
process often goes hand-in-hand with project management tools and methodology to ensure project
success, and Six Sigma practitioners apply leadership skills when leading a DMAIC project.
Lean (or lean production) traces its roots to a “disciplined, process-focused production
system”3 known as the Toyota Production System, developed by Eiji Toyoda, Taiichi Ohno, and
Shingeo Shingo at the Toyota Motor Company. The Toyota Production System is also linked with
Henry Ford’s monumental process improvement work in developing Ford Motor Company’s
assembly line. Lean methodology focuses on the elimination of “waste” (i.e. any activity which

3

Engr. Anisul Hoque Ansari, A Brief History of Lean Manufacturing https://memberfiles.freewebs.com/82/66/45306682/documents/A%20Short%20Book%20on%20LEAN%20UNDER
STANDING-Ansari.pdf
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absorbs resources but creates no value) and more knowledge- and experience-based principles than
Six Sigma methodology (Antony et al., 2017). Waste in Lean methodology can be identified and
categorized as follows (typically referred to as “the eight wastes”)4:
1. Defects: waste from a product or service failure to meet customer expectations
2. Overproduction: waste from making more product than customers demand
3. Waiting: waste from time spent waiting for the next process step to occur
4. Unused Talent: wastes due to underutilization of people’s talents, skills, and
knowledge
5. Transportation: wasted time, resources, and costs when unnecessarily moving
products and materials
6. Inventory: wastes resulting from excess products and materials that aren’t
processed
7. Motion: wasted time and effort related to unnecessary movements by people
8. Extra-Processing: wastes related to more work or higher quality than is
required

I.2

Application of Lean Six Sigma
Organizations implementing either Lean or Six Sigma methodology often employ

individuals certified as Green Belts, Black Belts, or Master Black Belts to ensure successful
deployment and consistent application of the business process improvement methodology (Brewer
& Eighme, 2005). The varying Belt levels are often distinguished by the degree of training one
receives, the scope and significance of a project led by the Belt for certification, and the level of
knowledge and degree of application of LSS tools and methodology. Black Belts typically undergo
four weeks of training while leading a large-scale high priority project within their organization.
Green Belts undergo a minimum of one to two weeks of training, and lead small-to-medium-scale

4

Nawras Shkmot, The 8 Wastes of Lean (The Lean Way: August 5, 2017) - https://theleanway.net/The-8-Wastes-ofLean
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projects or provide support to Black Belts and Master Black Belts on larger projects. As part of
their LSS infrastructure, most organizations instill Process Improvement Champions (also known
as Project Sponsors), typically senior leaders within the organization who determine which
projects the Belts should be working on, and remove roadblocks to ensure their success
(Montgomery & Woodall, 2008). Unfortunately, a universal standard for Belt certification does
not yet exist, and individuals can potentially complete an LSS course to obtain the certification,
without having demonstrated application on an actual project (Laureani & Antony, 2011).
Most organizations now implement a combination of Lean and Six Sigma (hence the term
“Lean Six Sigma”) as an overall approach. LSS “is a methodology that maximizes shareholder
value by achieving the fastest rate of improvement in customer satisfaction, cost, quality, process
speed and invested capital” (George, 2002 :iv), and the need for a hybrid methodology is due to
“the endless pursuit of organizations to improve” (Bhuiyan & Baghel, 2005: 769). To explain the
importance of combining Lean and Six Sigma, George (2002: iv-v) states that “Lean cannot bring
a process under statistical control” and “Six Sigma alone cannot dramatically improve process
speed or reduce invested capital”. The importance of the integration of Lean and Six Sigma
solidifies its trajectory for continuous growth and evolution across the globe (Antony et al., 2017).
LSS has been implemented by both private sector and not-for-profit organizations as a way
to increase revenue by “eliminating variability, defects, and waste that undermine customer
loyalty”5. In 2004, the Chief Executive Officer of Bank of America reported savings of millions
of dollars in expenses in fewer than three years as a direct result of implementing Six Sigma
(Montgomery & Woodall, 2008). Snider Tire, Inc., one of the largest commercial tire and

5

iSixSigma, Definition of Six Sigma - https://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/six-sigma/
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retreading dealers in the United States, implemented LSS to reengineer their customer-store-plant
production transportation network, resulting in annual savings of $2 million USD (Ahire & Jensen,
2017). A qualitative analysis of 35 published case studies demonstrates the significant financial
savings for hospitals as a result of LSS implementation to improve process performance in areas
such as wait times and patient flow, subsequently resulting in increased patient satisfaction
(Honda, Bernardo, Gerolamo, & Davis, 2018).
INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) are also seeing the financial
benefits of LSS implementation, with World Vision reducing annual expenses by $1 million USD
in East Africa through process improvement projects focused on achieving better outcomes with
existing funding, people, and resources (Parris, 2013). The versatility of LSS methodology
facilitates its application in a variety of different industries such as healthcare (Bhat, Antony, Gijo,
& Cudney, 2020; Dileep, Rau, & Satish, 2014), banking (Wang & Chen, 2010; Vijaya Sunder,
2016), telecom services (Shamsuzzaman, Alzeraif, Alsyouf, & Khoo, 2018), information
technology support services (Gijo, Antony, & Vijaya, 2019), and the public sector including higher
education, police service, public hospital, and local government (Antony, Rodgers, & Cudney,
2016).
I.3

Challenges in Lean Six Sigma Sustainment
Although many organizations embracing LSS have been incredibly successful – for

example, the United States Army realizing cost savings of over $2 billion USD and Allied Signal
(an American aerospace, automotive, and engineering company which later acquired Honeywell)
saving $800 million USD6 – the majority of all corporate Six Sigma initiatives (approximately 60

6

Six Sigma Daily, Saving From the Start with Lean Six Sigma - https://www.sixsigmadaily.com/saving-start-leansix-sigma/
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percent) fail to reap the benefits intended by the methodology (Angel & Pritchard, 2008).
Managers in organizations implementing LSS have a plethora of tools available to them when it
comes to DMAIC implementation and achieving process improvement (De Oliveira, Queiroz
Schünemann, Zattar, & Seleme, 2018), with formalized training and education readily available
either through internal or external support networks. However, there is a dearth of detailed
guidance available in the literature on the long-term maintenance and sustainability of a successful
Lean Six Sigma program within an organization – and hence this study seeks to answer the
following research question:
How can an enterprise organize and manage its Lean Six Sigma program to
successfully sustain it over time?
The study provides key insights to both researchers and practitioners into addressing the
challenges of implementing and sustaining LSS in large-scale organizations. Practical guidelines
and approaches are laid forth for managers and senior leadership to carve out a path within their
large-scale organizations for long-term sustainment of the process improvement methodology.
This novel and retrospective case study brings immense value by focusing on the perspective and
internal insights of LSS managers and senior leadership and adds to the body of LSS sustainment
literature. The key components of the study are summarized in Table 1 below:
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Table 1: Research Design Summary (adapted from Mathiassen, 2017)
Component Definition

Specification

Title

The title expresses the essence of Sustainable Organization of a Lean Six
the research design, with an
Sigma Program: A Competing Values
emphasis on the contributions.
Perspective

RQ

The research question relates to
the problem setting; it opens the
research into the area of concern
and helps ensure the research
design is coherent and
consistent.

How can an enterprise organize and manage
its Lean Six Sigma program to successfully
sustain it over time?

P

The problem setting represents
people’s concerns in a realworld problematic situation.

Organizations are keen in implementing LSS
programs, but the majority experience
challenges in achieving long-term
sustainment and discontinue the program
after a few years. LSS methodology provides
a framework for managers to achieve
process improvement, but lacks a framework
for organizations to manage and effectively
sustain their LSS programs.

A

The area of concern represents
some body of knowledge within
the literature that relates to the
problem setting.

Managing competing values in
organizational effectiveness to attain longterm sustainment of an LSS program.

F

The conceptual framing helps
structure collection and analyses
of data from the problem setting
to answer the research question.
FA draws on concepts from the
areas of concern, whereas FI
draws on concepts independent
of the area of concern.

FI: Competing Values Framework (Quinn &
Rohrbaugh, 1981)

M

The method details the approach
to empirical inquiry, specifically
to data collection and analysis.

A retrospective case study of how Johnson
& Johnson Inc. achieved long-term
sustainment of its LSS program by
managing competing values in

9
organizational effectiveness.
C

The contributions to the problem
setting and area of concern and
possibly to the conceptual
framework and method.

CP (Contribution to the Problem Setting):
Lessons for how organizations can
effectively manage competing values to
effectively sustain their LSS program.
CA (Contribution to the Area of Concern):
A detailed empirical account of a Fortune
500 organization which effectively achieved
long-term sustainment of its LSS program.
CF (Contribution to the Framework):
Application of the Competing Values
Framework to an LSS program.
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II

PROBLEM SETTING

II.1 Investment Needed for Lean Six Sigma Implementation
To implement an LSS program within a large-scale organization, a significant investment
is required to establish organizational LSS infrastructure, provide LSS training to employees, and
instill an LSS culture change in its daily processes and procedures. GE reported an investment of
$1.6 billion USD into Six Sigma (with investments increasing year-over-year) from 1996 to 1999
to realize cost savings of $4.43 billion USD7. Organizational LSS infrastructure typically involves
the recruitment of Master Black Belts from outside the organization who have had significant
experience in leading and maintaining successful LSS programs in other organizations. Ford Motor
Company’s launch of Six Sigma in the early 2000s was led by the expertise of Master Black Belts
from GE, West Point (the United States Military Academy), and other successful LSS
organizations who provided training to Ford Motor Company managers who were selected to
become certified as Black Belts and Green Belts.
Ford Motor Company’s Black Belt training program involved four weeks of in-person
training by Master Black Belts at their headquarters office in Dearborn, Michigan over a period of
four months, with each Black Belt leading a large-scale project with a minimum cost savings or
cost avoidance of $100,000 USD (or providing assistance to a Master Black Belt on his/her
project). The Green Belt training program involved one-and-a-half weeks of in-person training
(usually at a location local to participants) and leading a medium-scale project with $50,000 USD
minimum savings (or providing assistance to Black Belts or Master Black Belts). Master Black
Belts typically also provided training to LSS Process Improvement Champions and LSS project
team members and stakeholders. As organizations often partner closely with third-party suppliers

7

Michael Cyger, Six Sigma Costs and Savings - https://www.isixsigma.com/implementation/financial-analysis/sixsigma-costs-and-savings/
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or vendors who are critical to their success, staff members from third-party organizations may also
be included in the Belt, Champion, team member, or stakeholder training classes.
LSS culture transformation within an organization involves the restructuring of
organizational strategy and planning, program and project identification, program and project
selection, program and project management, process improvement practices, performance
measurement, and process sustainability practices and controls. Master Black Belts, Black Belts,
and Green Belts must be empowered as project leaders to navigate the organization to obtain
collaborative participation from cross-functional teams and departments, and be fully supported
by Process Improvement Champions who assist in removing roadblocks and prioritizing resources.
The human resources department also provides critical support in organizational design changes
required for LSS implementation including staff recruitment, talent development, cultural
transformation, and possibly change management and internal communications.
II.2 Guiding Principles for Lean Six Sigma Sustainment
One model that LSS managers and practitioners can consider in achieving and sustaining
competitive advantage is the “Ten Commandments of Lean Six Sigma” (Antony, Gupta, Vijaya,
& Gijo, 2018), based on several years of experience by the authors as researchers, LSS Master
Black Belts, consultants, practitioners, and trainers on various topics of LSS, general quality
management, and continuous improvement:
1. Alignment of Lean Six Sigma initiative with organizational strategy
2. Lean Six Sigma project selection and prioritization
3. Selection of top talent for project execution
4. Leadership for Lean Six Sigma
5. Effective training and design of appropriate curriculum for different Lean Six
Sigma roles

12
6. Development of reward and recognition system
7. Lean Six Sigma sustainability
8. Linking Lean Six Sigma with organizational learning and innovation
9. Linking Lean Six Sigma with environment management system standards
10. Lean Six Sigma and Big Data
In a case study undertaken to explore and analyze an LSS implementation within an Irish
university, O’Reilly, Healy, and O’Dubhghalil (2018) revealed several factors in addition to the
fiscal environment that are critical to initiating and sustaining an LSS program. These include the
need to respond to increasingly demanding stakeholders, aligning implementation with
organizational strategy, understanding the role of internal and external specialists, and
understanding the structured approach of LSS. Of particular importance is highlighting the key
role and behaviors of the Project Champion, which is similarly a critical component in achieving
success in project management implementations (Kloppenborg & Tesch, 2015).
In addition, one must also focus on the effectiveness of the LSS leadership team (which
often includes Process Improvement Champions). An LSS leadership framework was proposed by
Lu, Laux, and Antony (2017), focusing on service and the concepts of adaptive, rather than
technical work, of leaders in higher education. Their model serves as a fundamental base to
sustaining LSS improvements, and incorporates the key components of leadership, statistical
thinking, continuous change, and improvement to achieve improved bottom line results and
customer satisfaction in a wide range of industries.
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II.3 Root Causes Behind Failures in Lean Six Sigma Sustainment
Home Depot and 3M are examples of large-scale organizations which have struggled with
the sustainment of Six Sigma, with profits initially soaring but later plummeting8. Organizations
often misunderstand the theory and concepts behind LSS (Drake, Sutterfield, & Ngassam, 2008),
resulting in faulty application of the methodology and consequently lack of support within the
organization for its continued sustainment. What are the root causes behind the majority of LSS
initiatives failing to reap the benefits from implementation of the methodology?
An online survey involving 42 Six Sigma Master Black Belts, Black Belts, Green Belts,
and Process Improvement Champions was conducted by Antony, Lizarelli, Fernandes, Dempsey,
Brennan, and McFarlane (2019) which found the following ten factors to be the main causes for
Six Sigma project failures (in descending order):
1. There is employee’s resistance to change
2. Lack of top management commitment in project planning (resource
allocation)
3. Lack of top management commitment in project implementation
(monitoring and controlling)
4. Lack of facilitators with key positions in the organization to ensure
management commitment
5. The management does not understand the causes of employee’s resistance
of underperformance, and does not take immediate action
6. Lack of involvement of top management in conceptualization (goal setting
and project selection)
7. Lack of project leadership skills necessary to lead the team
8. There are no strategies to convince resistant employees to maintain a
positive attitude regarding process improvement projects
9. There is not enough time being allocated to data and information
8
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collection in order to deploy tools and techniques effectively
10. Lack of employee participation and involvement in problem solving
The study concluded that moderate failure rates were seen in manufacturing organizations’ process
improvement projects, with the failures most often occurring in the Measure, Analyze, Improve,
and Control phases of the Six Sigma methodology (Antony et al., 2019), despite previous studies
indicating the Define phase as being the critical one (Pyzdek and Keller, 2018; Voehl, Harrington,
Mignosa, & Charron, 2014). Antony et al.’s (2019) study was also the first empirical one to
demonstrate resistance to change (partial cooperation by employees) as being the main reason for
process improvement project failure, bolstering previous findings by McLean and Antony (2014).
A key reason behind challenges in LSS sustainability is that an implementation model does
not yet exist to guide organizations in successfully implementing the methodology (Fursule,
Bansod, & Fursule, 2012). To understand LSS sustainability at the organizational level, Sony,
Naik, and Therisa (2018) conducted a case study of two companies in India, one in manufacturing
and the other from the service sector, which had discontinued their LSS programs within six years
of implementation. They found the following to be emerging themes behind the failures in
organizational LSS sustainability:
1. Poor success rate: LSS projects fail to deliver promised results within a given
time, even with sufficient funding, training, and organizational support.
2. Unrealistic expectations from LSS: Goals and objectives are unfairly
influenced by external parties such as consultants and the media, and LSS is
seen as a “magic wand” to achieve the results.
3. Unsustainable results: LSS organizations fail to appreciate the importance of
behavioral change (e.g. leadership, change management, organizational

15
learning, and creativity), and only focus on the quantitative process
improvement elements.
4. Misuse of statistics: LSS practitioners may sometimes misuse statistical tools
or misinterpret the results. Assumptions may also be due to a “blind belief in
statistics” (Sony et al., 2018) or perhaps an incorrect required sample size.
5. Large tool set: The process improvement team may possibly use the wrong
tool for the problem-at-hand based, and may not have sufficient experience
with the multitude of LSS tools available.
6. Unsupportive and uncommitted top management: Isolated teams which lack
support from management to help prioritize resources and remove roadblocks
often result in failed projects.
7. Lack of training and development: LSS methodology can be complex and
rigorous, especially with the application of statistical and process
improvement tools which are new to the organization.
8. Lack of synergy of LSS and business strategy: Alignment with businesscritical priorities is key to an organization’s LSS sustainability.
9. Lack of link between LSS and customer needs: In addition to business strategy
alignment, LSS initiatives need to meet customers’ expectations.
10. Wrong project selection: Organizations need to ensure the project selection
process is rigorous, fact-based, and evaluated using the right criteria.
11. Premature discontinuation of LSS expert: Without Master Black Belts, Black
Belts, or Green Belts leading process improvement initiatives, it becomes
more challenging for an organization to sustain its LSS program long-term.
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II.4 A Long-Term Lean Six Sigma Sustainment Success Story
Despite the common challenges associated with long-term LSS sustainment, Johnson &
Johnson Inc. (J&J) in Canada has implemented and sustained LSS within its organization for 13
years (from 2002 to 2015) via its “Process Excellence” program. The program was first
implemented within McNeil Consumer Healthcare in 2002, and later incorporated into J&J (due
to J&J’s merger with McNeil Consumer Healthcare and Pfizer Canada Inc. in 2007). J&J is a largescale consumer health company and a member of the J&J Family of Companies which operates
“in more than 60 countries, employing nearly 128,000 people across 275 operating companies”9.
J&J has offices in Markham and Montreal and markets and sells “some of Canada’s leading brands
in the Baby Care, Oral Health Care, Wound Care, Nicotine Replacement Therapy, Skin and Hair
Care, Nutritionals, Non-Prescription Drugs and Eye Care categories”10. J&J’s brands include:
Aveeno, Band-Aid, Benadryl, Benylin, Clean & Clear, Desitin, Imodium, Johnson & Johnson First
Aid, Johnson’s Baby, Lactaid, Listerine, Lubriderm, Maui Moisture, Motrin, Neutrogena,
Nicoderm, Nicorette, OGX, Penaten, Pepcid, Polysporin, Reactine, RoC, Rogaine, Sinutab,
Sudafed, Tylenol, and Visine.
J&J’s LSS journey began in Montreal (the original location of their Canadian headquarters)
with the training of a handful of Six Sigma Green Belts and Black Belts in the early 2000s. McNeil
Consumer Healthcare, a manufacturing site in Guelph had officially launched their Process
Excellence program around the same period (in 2002), with the training of 16 Six Sigma Black
Belts. The merger between J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer resulted in the J&J headquarters office being
moved from Montreal to Markham (and the post-merger Process Excellence team thus being based
out of Markham). The Process Excellence team (consisting of a Director and two certified Six

9
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Sigma Black Belt managers) was responsible for identifying and leading large-scale strategic
projects aimed at continuous improvement, cost reduction, innovation, and streamlining processes
within J&J.
The team also provided LSS capacity building for staff members to obtain training and
certification as Six Sigma Red Belts (J&J’s internally developed program), Green Belts, and Black
Belts. Additional training courses were developed and facilitated by the Process Excellence
department in Lean methodology (including Kaizen facilitation, value-stream mapping, Lean
culture, Lean standard work for leaders, Lean “5S11”, and Lean mistake-proofing), systematic
thinking/innovation techniques, change management, project management, lessons learned,
conflict resolution profiles, communication behaviors, and risk management. A Process
Excellence Leadership Team was also established to provide guidance, coaching, and mentoring
to Belt candidates as they executed and implemented their projects. This support would often
extend to other J&J affiliate companies operating in Canada, such as LifeScan Canada Ltd. (in
Burnaby), Janssen Inc. (in Toronto), J&J Medical Products (in Markham), and J&J Vision Care
Canada (in Markham).
Within the last decade, J&J has experienced several instances of significant organizational
transformation, resulting in staff layoffs, changes in leadership, and changes in organizational
structure. Other major events impacting the stability of the organization include mergers and
acquisitions, product recalls, a consent decree issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and negative media coverage related to J&J affiliate activities in the U.S. (such as the
opioid, baby powder, and Risperdal lawsuits). Coupling these organizational challenges with

United States Environmental Protection Agency, Lean Thinking and Methods – 5S https://www.epa.gov/sustainability/lean-thinking-and-methods5s#:~:text=The%205S%20pillars%2C%20Sort%20(Seiri,sustaining%20a%20productive%20work%20environment.
11
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overall LSS sustainability challenges, it is certainly a remarkable success story to showcase and
highlight J&J’s long-term LSS journey.
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III THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
III.1 Organizational Effectiveness and the Competing Values Framework
How does an organization evaluate whether the implementation of LSS has been beneficial
or detrimental to its way of doing business? What criteria or measures of effectiveness can be used
to compare the relative performance of multiple organizations, knowing that significant
differences may exist when it comes to the industry sector, revenue sources, supply chain systems,
government regulations, brand reputation, financial management, stock performance, and
countless other defining characteristics? Is the “bottom line” the best way to evaluate
organizational effectiveness as a standardized measure? How does an organization ensure that its
LSS projects contribute to improving its organizational effectiveness?
Although organizational effectiveness had been comprehensively discussed in the
organizational behavior literature, a set of standards for measuring and validating organizational
effectiveness did not yet exist in the early 1980s. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) addressed this gap
by conducting a multivariate analysis to identify dimensions of organizational effectiveness such
that organizations could employ a unified set of indicators. The framework was developed to meet
the following conditions (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981):
1. a single level of analysis;
2. provide a more holistic view;
3. present a well-defined set of criteria;
4. assert relationships between criteria;
5. recognize the dynamic nature of organizations and variability across time;
6. allow for application in specific scenarios, but be generalizable across
multiple scenarios; and
7. explicitly define effectiveness
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The criteria for determining organizational effectiveness can be classified in three value
dimensions, which Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983: 369) identify as competing values, and whose
relationship is shown in Figure 2 as the Competing Values Framework:
•

organizational focus: “from an internal, micro emphasis on the well-being and
development of people in the organization to an external, macro emphasis on the wellbeing and development of the organization itself”

•

organizational structure: “from an emphasis on stability to an emphasis on flexibility”

•

organizational means and ends: “from an emphasis on important processes (e.g.,
planning and goal setting) to an emphasis on final outcomes (e.g., productivity)”

Figure 2: Competing Values Framework (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981)
The first dimension (“organizational focus”, along the x-axis) represents the dilemma or
tension that exists when making decisions between those that focus on the betterment of the
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individual versus the organization as a whole. As an example, an organization focusing on the
individual may choose to make an investment in LSS training for a select cadre of staff members
to later become certified Black Belts or Master Black Belts, and hence be resident experts in the
application of LSS methodology. Another organization focusing instead on the organization as a
whole may invest in basic LSS training for all staff members, such that every individual employed
by the organization has at least a minimum working knowledge of LSS tools and methodology.
The second dimension (“organizational structure”, along the y-axis) represents the
dilemma or tension that an organization faces when making decisions between the need to be
nimble and agile versus embracing the reliability and consistency that stability often brings. Should
an organization accept the risk associated with investing in the latest cloud-based technology (i.e.
be flexible), or continue with the tried-and-true physical servers that have been functionally
effectively for the last decade (i.e. maintain control)? Should a consumer packaged goods
organization focus its energy on incorporating newly discovered rainforest botanicals (i.e. be
flexible), or continue investing in traditional ingredients such as aloe and soybean oil for its body
lotions (i.e. maintain control)?
The third dimension (“organizational means and ends”, along the z-axis or depth axis)
represents the dilemma or tension an organization faces in focusing on important processes (such
as planning and goal setting) versus final outcomes (such as productivity). For example, a software
organization focused on important processes may decide to undertake an extensively thorough
quality assurance process to fully test all potential scenarios related to a software bug before
releasing any software patches to the general public. This certainly takes a longer period of time
in comparison to only testing a few potential scenarios, but the result should essentially be a higher
quality solution. On the other hand, this same software organization may focus instead on final
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outcomes and release an initial software patch immediately which they are certain can resolve
specific scenarios. This has the advantage of being able to respond quickly to their customers, but
may still involve additional problem solving and testing by the software organization after the
initial release (as not all use cases were accounted for initially).
When the axes are juxtaposed, four models of organization are depicted, described by
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) as follows:
1. The Human Relations Model: which stresses the effectiveness criteria of
cohesion and morale (as means) and human resource development (as an
end).
2. The Open System Model: which stresses the effectiveness criteria of
flexibility and readiness (as means) and growth and resource acquisition
(as an end).
3. The Internal Process Model: which stresses the effectiveness criteria of
information management and communication (as means) and stability and
control (as an end).
4. The Rational Goal Model: which stresses the effectiveness criteria of
planning and goal setting (as a means) and productivity and efficiency (as
an end).
III.2 Competing Values Framework Application to Lean Six Sigma Sustainability
The Competing Values Framework has been applied in many different contexts in various
industries to measure organizational effectiveness, such as hospital network performance in Italy
(Bravi, Gibertoni, Marcon, Sicotte, Minvielle, Rucci, Angelastro, Carradori, & Fantini, 2013),
workplace empowerment in the Indian banking sector (Sharma & Kaur, 2011), psychological
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climates and turnover intention in Korean central government agencies (Jung, Chan, & Hsieh,
2017), performance appraisal systems (Ikramullah, Van Prooijen, Iqbal, & Ul-Hassan, 2015),
managerial effectiveness in a KwaZulu-Natal public sector division (Parumasur & Govender,
2009), and cultural variation in software process improvement in Denmark (Müller,
Krӕmmergaard, & Mathiassen, 2009). In 2003, the Competing Values Framework was
“recognized by the Financial Times as one of the 40 most important management frameworks in
history” and “is now the foundation for consulting practices, executive education courses, and
numerous leadership development programs”12.
It has been proposed that the Competing Values Framework should be extended to include
a fourth dimension: motivational trait, based on tensions observed between heart and head that
were particularly relevant for improving organizational effectiveness in a voluntary organization
serving the developmentally disabled (Grabowski, Neher, Crim, & Mathiassen, 2015). Grabowski
et al. (2015) applied rigorous action research methodology to analyze the organizational
effectiveness of Right in the Community, where challenges existed in staff resourcing,
organizational structure and governance, and innovative capabilities. The “head-heart” dimension
recognized “the important role played by the interdependent nature of cognition and affect in
directing the attitudes and behaviors” (Grabowski et al., 2015: 911) within Right in the
Community.
With its robustness in being applicable to a broad range of organization types and “its
explicit depiction of organizational effectiveness as a paradoxical construct” (Arsenault &
Faerman, 2014: 148), the Competing Values Framework is well suited as a framework to analyze
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the various challenges (or tensions) an organization faces in the implementation and sustainability
of its LSS program:
1. With the Competing Value Framework’s first dimension related to
organizational focus, is it more important for the organization to focus on
individual development versus development of the organization as a
whole, and how does its LSS program facilitate this?
2. With the Competing Value Framework’s second dimension related to
organizational structure, is it more important for the organization to be
flexible or maintain stability and control, and how does its LSS program
facilitate this?
3. With the Competing Value Framework’s third dimension related to
organizational means and ends, is it more important for the organization
to focus on important processes versus final outcomes, and how does its
LSS program facilitate this?
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IV METHODOLOGY
IV.1 Case Study Design
This study involves a retrospective, in-depth case study of a Fortune 500 organization (J&J)
which has been successful in both implementing and sustaining LSS for 13 years (from 2002 to
2015). Based on an interpretive research approach (Myers, 2013), we decided to adopt the case
study method based on a number of considerations. First, the research question seeks to understand
a “how” question in a real-world context (i.e. how an enterprise organizes and manages its LSS
program to successfully sustain it over time), which is one of the key characteristics of a case
study, “especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly
evident” (Yin, 2014: 2). Second, the case study is ideal in situations or scenarios where the
researcher or author has little or no control over the events which occur, and any relevant behaviors
cannot be manipulated (Yin, 2014), as is the case in this study. Third, this case study is an empirical
inquiry relying on multiple sources of evidence, and investigates a contemporary phenomenon
(versus an entirely historical phenomenon, which distinguishes the case study method from a
history) (Yin, 2014).
Per Myers (2013: 12-13), “qualitative research is perhaps the best way for research in
business and management to become both rigorous and relevant at the same time”, where “relevant
research is usually defined as research that is of immediate relevance to business professionals”.
Our research model takes the form of a process model, which “explains development in terms of
the order in which things occur and the stage in the process at which they occur” (Van de Ven,
2007: 154). Our case study meets Van de Ven’s (2007: 154-158) characteristics of a process model
as follows:
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1.

“The world is made up of entities that participate in events. These entities
may change over time as a result.” – The unit of analysis (J&J’s
implementation of its LSS program) may change through a number of
processes such as downsizing, organizational re-structuring, company
mergers, etc.

2. “Final and formal causality, supplemented by efficient causality, is the
basis for explanation.” – J&J’s maintenance and sustainability of its LSS
program may be affected by critical events, such as a lawsuit or product
recall, which influence its direction and outcome.
3. “The generality of explanations depends on their versatility.” – The
narrative explanations from this study may include events which are
inherently complex, which is a defining feature of a process narrative.
4. “The temporal sequence of events is critical.” – The order in which events
occur at J&J may potentially result in very different outcomes for its LSS
program.
5. “Explanations should incorporate layers of explanation ranging from
immediate to distal.” – The sequence of events for J&J’s LSS journey
result in a unique causal history which causes the narrative to unfold in a
particular way.
6. “An entity, attribute, or event may change in meaning over time.” – In
addition to the J&J organization itself changing over time, the
maintenance and sustainability of its LSS program would also change over
time.
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Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) framework for organizational effectiveness guided the case
study by using the concept of Competing Values to help shape the data collection and analysis.
Finally, we adopted an engaged scholarship approach, which is “a participative form of research
for obtaining the advice and perspectives of key stakeholders (researchers, users, clients, sponsors,
and practitioners) to understand a complex social problem” (Van de Ven, 2007: ix). In particular,
we undertake the collaborative basic research form of engaged scholarship, which involves the
collaboration of both insiders and outsiders jointly sharing the research activities “to co-produce
basic knowledge about a complex problem or phenomenon” (Van de Ven, 2007: 27). The author
(the “insider”) is a previous employee of J&J’s Process Excellence team as a Certified Six Sigma
Black Belt, and worked collaboratively in this study with her advisor (the “outsider”) to take
advantage of their complementary skills.
IV.2 Data Collection
As case studies rely on multiple sources of evidence to develop a comprehensive
understanding of a real-world phenomenon (Yin, 2014), our data collection approach sought to
capture information from various perspectives within J&J. Individual phone/video interviews and
qualitative email surveys were conducted between February and July 2020 with 17 current or
former staff members of J&J, with no compensation made to the participants. The potential
interviewees and survey participants were selected based on their roles, involvement, expertise,
and experience in the implementation of the Process Excellence program at J&J. Invitations to
potential interviewees and survey participants were sent via email, LinkedIn messaging, or
Facebook messaging.
To develop and validate the timeline for J&J’s Process Excellence program, an initial set
of questions focusing on the timeline were included as part of the first set of phone/video
interviews. After a brief overview of Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values
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Framework was provided, interviewees in this first group were then asked to provide examples of
where J&J focused on individual competing values, reflections on the overall Process Excellence
program, and recommendations for other LSS organizations. The full list of interview questions
for this group (referred to as Part 1) are outlined in Table 2 below:
Table 2: List of Interview Questions (Part 1)
Section

Interview Questions (Part 1)

A. Interviewee Profile 1.
2.
3.
4.

What is your name, current title, and place of employment?
What years were you employed at J&J?
What roles or positions have you had at J&J?
What training or certification (if any) do you have in Lean, Six
Sigma, or process improvement in general?
5. Prior to J&J, did you have any experience in Lean, Six Sigma, or
process improvement? Please describe.
6. Can you describe your involvement in J&J’s Lean Six Sigma
program, and your role as a leader, practitioner, or customer of
the program?

B. Competing Values
Focus Areas

1. People vs. Organization:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the needs of the individual vs. the needs of the
organization?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the needs of the organization vs. the needs of the
individual?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
values (i.e. people vs. organization) play into the
ongoing maintenance and sustainment of its LSS
program?
2. Flexibility vs. Control:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the need to be flexible vs. the need to maintain
control?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the need to maintain control vs. the need to be
flexible?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
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values (i.e. flexibility vs. control) play into the ongoing
maintenance and sustainment of its LSS program?
3. Means vs. Ends:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the importance of means (e.g. processes, planning, and
goal setting) vs. ends (e.g. final outcomes and
productivity)?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the importance of ends (e.g. final outcomes and
productivity) vs. means (e.g. processes, planning, and
goal setting)?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
values (i.e. means vs. ends) play into the ongoing
maintenance and sustainment of its LSS program?
C. Reflections and
Recommendations

1. In hindsight, what recommendations would you have for things
that J&J could have done differently with their Lean Six Sigma
program?
2. I understand that the Lean Six Sigma program is no longer in
existence today as a formal program at J&J. What do you think
led to this critical organizational decision?
3. What do you feel are the key success factors for J&J’s ability to
achieve long-term sustainment of its Lean Six Sigma program?
4. What recommendations do you have for other organizations who
are currently implementing or maintaining their Lean Six Sigma
program, and worried about its sustainability?

As a result of the input provided by the first group of phone/video interviewees, the timeline
below in Figure 3 was developed, and included as part of the second set of phone/video interviews:
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Figure 3: Timeline of J&J’s Process Excellence Program
The three interviewees from the first group also participated in the second group of
interviews, and were asked an additional set of questions (referred to as Part 2) focused on J&J’s
management of competing values through the various time periods of its Process Excellence
program outlined in Table 3 below:
Table 3: List of Interview Questions (Part 2)
Section

Interview Questions (Part 2)

D. Competing Values
within Process
Excellence
Timeline

1. During the implementation of the Process Excellence program at
J&J/McNeil (2002-2007):
a. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
People vs. Organization?
b. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
Flexibility vs. Control?
c. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
Means vs. Ends?
2. During the merger of J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer (2007-2008):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
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3. During the stabilization of the Process Excellence program (20082011):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
4. During the move of the Process Excellence program from Corporate
to Supply Chain (2011-2013):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
5. During the discontinuation of the Process Excellence training (20132015):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
6. During the discontinuation of the Process Excellence program (in
2015) and leading up to today:
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?

Four additional interviewees (different than the first three mentioned) were asked questions
from Part 1 (specifically, Section A for the ‘Interviewee Profile’ questions and Section C for the
‘Reflections and Recommendations’ questions) and Part 2 (specifically, Section D for the
‘Competing Values within Process Excellence Timeline’ questions). Several other potential
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interviewees were approached to determine their interest and availability in being included in this
second group – but due to the complexities associated with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,
some were unable to commit to a full-length phone/video interview. As an alternative, they were
invited to respond to two survey questions via email (outlined in Table 4 below). As the survey
questions could be answered by a broader set of individuals, the author invited several others to
respond to the survey, and a total of 11 responses were received via email or phone/video
interview.
Table 4: Survey Questions
Section

Survey Questions

Reflections and
Recommendations

What do you feel are the key strengths behind the sustainment of the
Process Excellence program at J&J, and what value did it bring to you
as a leader, practitioner, or stakeholder?
In hindsight, what recommendations would you have for things that J&J
could have done differently with the Process Excellence program?

All confirmed participants were provided with a copy of the research protocol (Appendix
A), interview protocol (Appendix B and/or C, dependent on the phone/video interview group they
were in), and the informed consent form (Appendix E). For the phone/video interviews, brief
handwritten notes were taken by the author, in addition to the interviews being digitally-recorded
(with each interviewee’s consent) to facilitate data collection and transcription. The interviews
were conducted by either phone or internet (via Zoom video conferencing software), and were
scheduled for 60 minutes in duration each. As some required additional time outside of the 60
minutes allotted, interviewees participated in an additional follow-up interview, lasting no more
than 30 minutes. Each interviewee’s participation in the study did not exceed two hours in total.
All names and other identifying facts of the participants do not appear in the study or published
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results. The findings have been summarized and reported in group form, with participants not
being identified personally.
As seen in Tables 2 and 3 above, the format of our semi-structured interviews follows
Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values Framework, with questions focusing on the
three dimensions of the framework: organizational focus (i.e. people vs. organization),
organizational structure (i.e. flexibility vs. control), and organizational means and ends (i.e.
processes vs. final outcomes). All interview questions were open-ended, and aligned with the
research protocol. As case studies rely on “multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to
converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 2014: 17), literal replication or “triangulation by data
source” (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014: 299) was used to strengthen the confidence in the
findings. Triangulation provides the benefit of corroboration from multiple sources, and the
opportunity to investigate further when inconsistent or conflicting findings arise (Miles et al.,
2014).
Interview and survey responses were supplemented with publicly available materials such
as annual reports, trade journal articles, and website information. Approval for the study was
secured from the Institutional Review Board of Georgia State University on June 25, 2019 (IRB
Number H19700, Reference Number 355596).
IV.3 Data Analysis
Our data analysis was guided by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña’s (2014) view of
qualitative data analysis as three concurrent flows of activity: (1) data condensation, (2) data
display, and (3) conclusion drawing/verification. Data condensation refers to “the process of
selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and/or transforming the data that appear in the full
corpus (body) of written-up field notes, interview transcripts, documents, and other empirical
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materials” (Miles et al., 2014: 120). From the interview transcripts, findings and insights were
summarized, with common themes identified along with categories for “data chunks” (i.e. portions
of the transcribed data) for coding and further analysis. Data condensation is “a form of analysis
that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that “final” conclusions
can be drawn and verified” (Miles et al., 2014: 12).
A data display is “an organized, compressed assembly of information that allows
conclusion drawing and action” (Miles et al., 2014: 12-13). As part of the analysis, summary tables
were developed, guided by the three dimensions outlined in Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981)
Competing Values Framework. Data displays are “designed to assemble organized information
into an immediately accessible, compact form so that the analyst can see what is happening and
either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next step of analysis that the display suggests
may be useful” (Miles et al., 2014: 13). NVivo software was used to condense, code, display, and
interpret our data.
Conclusion drawing and verification involves the qualitative analyst “noting patterns,
explanations, causal flows, and propositions” (Miles et al., 2014: 13), with conclusions being
verified as the analyst proceeds. Further, “the meanings emerging from the data have to be tested
for their plausibility, their sturdiness, their confirmability – that is, their validity” (Miles et al.,
2014: 13-14). Preliminary conclusions were made cautiously, maintaining an open outlook until
they could be thoroughly verified and validated by our data and findings.
IV.4 Coding Data
To prepare for the coding of our data, a coding scheme was developed with elements based
on our theoretical framework – that is, Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values
Framework, with definitions for each concept or sub-concept. The questions from both sets of
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phone/video interviews (i.e. Parts 1 and 2) were incorporated into the coding scheme as shown
below in Table 5:
Table 5: Coding Scheme (Concepts, Sub-Concepts, and Definitions)
Theme

Concept

Interviewee Profile LSS Education and
1.0
Credentials
1.1

Sub-Concept

Definition

Training

‘Training’ describes the LSS
training taken by the
interviewee.
‘Certification’ describes the
LSS certification (e.g. Red
Belt, Green Belt, Black Belt,
Master Black Belt) attained by
the interviewee.

Certification

Involvement in
Leader
J&J’s LSS Program
1.2

Practitioner

Customer

Competing Values
Focus Areas
2.0

Organization Focus People/Individual
2.1
Organization

Involvement as a ‘leader’
includes departmental or
organizational decisions
relating to the direction of
J&J’s LSS program.
Involvement as a ‘practitioner’
includes leading or being part
of an LSS project at J&J,
taking LSS training
classes/courses at J&J, or
attaining LSS certification
while at J&J.
Involvement as a ‘customer’
includes being a project
sponsor/champion or
stakeholder for an LSS project
at J&J.
‘People/Individual’ includes
examples where J&J focused
on the needs of the individual.
‘Organization’ includes
examples where J&J focused
on the needs of the
organization.
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Organizational
Structure
2.2

Organizational
Focus with LSS

‘Organizational Focus with
LSS’ describes how J&J
managed the competing values
of People vs. Organization
with its LSS program.

Flexibility

‘Flexibility’ includes examples
where J&J focused on the need
to be flexible.
‘Control’ includes examples
where J&J focused on the need
to maintain control.
‘Organizational Structure with
LSS’ describes how J&J
managed the competing values
of Flexibility vs. Control with
its LSS program.

Control

Organizational
Structure with
LSS

Organizational
Means and Ends
2.3

Means

Ends

Organizational
Means and Ends
with LSS

Reflections and
Recommendations
3.0

‘Means’ includes examples
where J&J focused on the
importance of means (e.g.
processes, planning, and goal
setting).
‘Ends’ includes examples
where J&J focused on the
importance of ends (e.g. final
outcomes and productivity).
‘Organizational Means and
Ends with LSS’ describes how
J&J managed the competing
values of Means vs. Ends with
its LSS program.

Do Differently
3.1

n/a

‘Do Differently’ includes
recommendations for things
that J&J could have done
differently with their LSS
program.

LSS Program
Discontinued
3.2

n/a

‘LSS Program Discontinued’
includes potential reasons for
J&J discontinuing its LSS
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program.

Competing Values
within Process
Excellence
Timeline
4.0

Key Success
Factors
3.3

n/a

‘Key Success Factors’ includes
key success factors for J&J’s
ability to achieve LSS
sustainability.

Recommendations
for Other
Organizations
3.4

n/a

‘Recommendations for Other
Organizations’ includes
recommendations for other
organizations with LSS
programs.

Period 1
(Implementation of
the Process
Excellence Program
at J&J/McNeil)
4.1

People vs.
Organization

‘People vs. Organization’
describes how this set of
competing values was
managed during this period.
‘Flexibility vs. Control’
describes how this set of
competing values was
managed during this period.
‘Means vs. Ends’ describes
how this set of competing
values was managed during
this period.

Flexibility vs.
Control

Means vs. Ends

Period 2
People vs.
(J&J/McNeil/Pfizer Organization
Merger)
4.2
Flexibility vs.
Control

(same as in 4.1, but for Period
2)

Means vs. Ends
Period 3
(Stabilization of the
Process Excellence
Program)
4.3

People vs.
Organization

(same as in 4.1, but for Period
3)

Flexibility vs.
Control
Means vs. Ends

Period 4

People vs.

(same as in 4.1, but for Period

38
(Move of Process
Organization
Excellence Program
from Corporate to
Flexibility vs.
Supply Chain)
Control
4.4
Means vs. Ends

4)

Period 5
(Discontinuation of
Process Excellence
Training)
4.5

(same as in 4.1, but for Period
5)

People vs.
Organization
Flexibility vs.
Control
Means vs. Ends

Period 6
(Discontinuation of
the Process
Excellence
Program)
4.6

People vs.
Organization

(same as in 4.1, but for Period
6)

Flexibility vs.
Control
Means vs. Ends

Per Miles et al. (2014: 84), “Definitions become sharper when two researchers code the
same data set and discuss their initial difficulties. A disagreement shows that a definition has to be
expanded or otherwise amended… Team coding not only aids definitional clarity but also is a good
reliability check.”. The inter-coder reliability exercise involved testing of the coding scheme by
the author and an additional researcher to confirm both relevancy and a shared understanding of
the definitions, concepts, and sub-concepts. Descriptions for each period of J&J’s Process
Excellence program were also added to the coding scheme to facilitate the analysis within each
time period.
To achieve an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability within the 85-90% recommended
by Miles et al. (2014: 85), the finalized coding scheme was applied to the full-length transcriptions
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of two phone/video interviews. To bring additional clarity to the concept of competing values, the
author provided a brief overview of Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values Framework
(as shown in Figure 2) to the other researcher and answered questions regarding the coding scheme
and accompanying worksheet before beginning the inter-coder reliability exercise. After
individually completing the coding of 101 transcribed statements, we achieved an inter-coder
reliability of 100%, as outlined in Table 6 below:
Table 6: Inter-Coder Reliability Results
Theme (Section)
1.0 Interviewee Profile
2.0 Competing Values Focus Areas
3.0 Reflections and Recommendations
4.0 Competing Values within PE Timeline

# of Statements
to Code
4
48
26
23

# of Codes
Matched
4
48
26
23

% Match
100%
100%
100%
100%

Total % Match (Inter-Coder Reliability)

101

101

100%

As the coding scheme was now fully tested, with an inter-coder reliability score greater
than the recommended 85-90% range, we were able to create the coding scheme in NVivo. Each
of the phone/video interview transcripts were first manually edited using Temi software to correct
any automatic transcription errors, and then individually loaded into Nvivo. Each transcribed
statement was then coded in Nvivo according to the coding scheme, with summary charts exported
to Excel for further analysis and synthesis.
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V

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

V.1 J&J’s Value Focus in General
In addition to J&J managing the competing values of people versus organization, flexibility
versus control, and means versus ends throughout its Process Excellence program lifecycle, there
are many examples where the organization specifically focused on one competing value versus
another. We provide a contextual understanding of J&J as an organization, and how the
organization as a whole focused on one competing value versus another in scenarios related to and
outside of its Process Excellence program.
In the first set of competing values for the Competing Values Framework dimension of
organizational focus, we share examples of where J&J focused on the competing value of ‘people’
versus the competing value of ‘organization’. We then share examples of where J&J focused on
the competing value of ‘organization’ versus the competing value of ‘people’. We continue in a
similar format with examples provided for the two additional Competing Values Framework
dimensions of organizational structure (for the competing values of flexibility versus control) and
organizational means and ends (for the competing values of means versus ends).
V.1.1

People versus Organization

J&J’s Focus on ‘People’
During the tenure of the Process Excellence program at J&J from 2002 to 2015, more than
200 staff members were trained and/or certified as Black Belts, Green Belts, or Red Belts. This
constitutes a significant investment from J&J in the development of its people. As a comparison,
most LSS organizations “average about one-percent of their workforce as Six Sigma Black
Belts”13. At the initial onset of the Process Excellence program at McNeil Consumer Healthcare
(which is now a division of J&J), 16 staff members were trained as Black Belts and 16 to 24 staff
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members were trained as Green Belts, demonstrating both the importance of the program and the
strong support from leadership. A leadership team member and practitioner from J&J comments
on the investment made by J&J in its Six Sigma training program:
“I think in the end, we had probably 60% of the employees trained. So, you know,
obviously you're taking a lot of resources out of the organization for the
development and training of the people. So I think that's an example where they put
a lot of emphasis on individuals versus the needs of the organization. Ultimately,
you know, the payoff was that they would become practitioners, and help drive the
organization.”
Outside of the Process Excellence program, a significant investment was also made by the
organization in leadership development (including the development of management skills,
communication skills, and change management), innovation, compliance (such as manufacturing
and financial regulatory controls), and the personal health of its staff members. Training was
conducted by either classroom training or e-learning modules. A practitioner from J&J comments
on J&J’s long-term investment in personal health:
“The company definitely cares about people and about development. Especially
recently I think that they have [had] a lot of focus on health for people – personal
health. So there is the physical health, healthy eating, mental health – so getting
the employees to be at their best and [having] their energy for performance. So
there is this program that has been there probably for eight years or so. They [have
been] training employees to learn how to manage their energy throughout the day,
how to gain energy, how to be more balanced, how to recharge throughout the day,
and in general about being healthier, more balanced. So I think that part with
people is really great – that’s helping people.”
J&J’s Focus on ‘Organization’
J&J’s selection process for candidate LSS projects is an example where the company’s
focus was on organization versus people. Potential ideas for projects to be led by Black Belts,
Green Belts, and Red Belts were assessed by their alignment with the organizational strategy (in
addition to other project success criteria). The individual preferences of the Belts to work on certain
projects (perhaps due to personal interest and/or development needs) was outweighed by the
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project “fit” with J&J’s organization-critical imperatives. A leadership team member and
practitioner from J&J comments on the Process Excellence project selection process for Red Belts,
Green Belts, and Black Belts:
“We basically wanted to make sure that the project ultimately supported the
organization… We would pick projects or get them to pick projects that were
typically in their area, but actually help drive the organization. So, you know, the
ultimate goal is to drive the processes within the organization.”
One of the reasons behind J&J’s success as a consumer healthcare company is its ability to
focus on its top organizational priorities: revenue (and revenue growth), profit (and achieving its
target objectives), and quality (including patient safety). When quality issues arise, J&J’s global
organization has been known and lauded for its swift and ethical actions to ensure patient safety is
not compromised and product recalls are managed efficiently, as demonstrated in its handling of
the Tylenol tampering issue in 198214 and living out the commitments in its “Credo”15. A
practitioner at J&J comments on the importance the organization placed on quality and patient
safety:
“The organization definitely takes [quality and patient safety] matters seriously
and it ensures that the patients are protected and that a safe product is available
for customers and patients as needed… The organization is not shy about
prioritizing what people should spend their time on or how money should be spent.
And especially as the years went by, there was, in my opinion, a heightened focus
on that to ensure that profit and revenue expectations are being satisfied.”
V.1.2 Flexibility versus Control
J&J’s Focus on ‘Flexibility’
Based on the nature of J&J being a consumer healthcare organization, it was necessary for
the organization to focus mainly on control versus flexibility. Stringent controls are embedded
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within each of its manufacturing, regulatory, compliance, and financial processes, among other
areas. Although innovation is certainly a key proponent in facilitating product development and
new ways of working, an agile culture did not yet exist during the time of the Process Excellence
program – and thus flexibility was very rarely exerted when it came to foundational processes.
Triggers for J&J needing to apply more flexibility versus control often emerged as a result of
changes in customer expectations – for example, if the needs of J&J’s largest retail customers
(Walmart, Shoppers Drug Mart, Loblaw, Costco, etc.) should change. A practitioner at J&J
comments on J&J’s flexibility in response to changing customer expectations:
“[J&J] is not in a business that rewards flexibility. Consumer packaged goods is a
business governed by very well-understood rules, very strict market dynamics…
Customer expectations [changing] were the only cases where J&J would
demonstrate flexibility in terms of trying to maintain a customer account... Qualitywise and finance-wise, it does not tolerate a lot of flexibility and agility.”
More recently, an emphasis has been placed on the importance of servant leadership,
enabling decisions to be delegated at the team level (vs. only at the leadership level), and thus
allowing teams to feel more empowered as they navigate their cross-functional relationships and
break down their “silos”. Another example of flexibility is seen in J&J’s focus on team
collaboration, partnering to achieve organizational goals, and shifting individual priorities to what
is most important for the organization at the time. A leadership team member and practitioner at
J&J comments on the collaborative nature in achieving organizational goals:
“We had a very good operational team and it was alright for me to miss a goal, to
help somebody else achieve their goal. So I didn't get penalized because I missed
my goal. I got credited because I helped them achieve their goal. Because as an
organization, we deemed that goal more important than this goal... An organization
chart is how you report, not how you work.”
J&J’s Focus on ‘Control’
Due to significant quality issues identified in its manufacturing facilities in Las Piedras
(Puerto Rico), Fort Washington (Pennsylvania), and Lancaster (Pennsylvania), a consent decree
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of permanent injunction was issued by the U.S. FDA to McNeil-PPC, Inc. (a subsidiary of J&J) in
201116. Although the McNeil manufacturing plant in Guelph was not included as part of the
consent decree, J&J was forced to conduct a thorough review of its quality processes and controls
based on the severity of the consent decree and the need to win back the trust of both the FDA and
the general public. Tried and true practices such as “5S” (a Lean thinking approach to Sort, Set in
Order, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain a work environment17) could no longer be executed during
the consent decree as significant effort would need to be invested in educating the FDA on the
benefits of the 5S exercise. A practitioner at J&J comments on the constraints experienced by the
organization as a result of the consent decree:
“You have the FDA in every one of your management meetings. And [for] every
oversight decision, there was an FDA or their third-party representative overseeing
all of that. So it's definitely a forced control environment.”
Notwithstanding the consent decree, the critical importance of controls was inherent
throughout all of J&J’s processes, due to it being a highly regulated environment. A change from
one manufacturing supplier to another may potentially bring expected efficiencies to certain
processes in the plant, but strict rules and regulations mandated what specifically could be changed
and how the controls would be maintained. J&J would often apply safety measures and protocols
that were above and beyond the minimum requirements for certain products to ensure a
standardized process was applied across all products. A practitioner at J&J comments on the
standardization of product regulatory controls within the organization:
“Sometimes the standards that are needed for products that are classified as drugs
are incorporated into the products that are cosmetic. They don't necessarily [need
to] have the same standards or the same scrutiny because it's not needed by [the]
16
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external environment, but everybody feels more comfortable using the same control
internally and they end up being applied.”
V.1.3 Means versus Ends
J&J’s Focus on ‘Means’
J&J’s global organization has been recognized for the strength and powerful influence on
its staff members of its Credo18, written in 1943 by Robert Wood Johnson, former chairman and
member of the J&J global organization’s founding family, prior to the birth of “corporate social
responsibility”19. The Credo serves as a guiding compass for the organization, providing an ethical
framework to validate business decisions and working practices against. This strong culture of
ethics coupled with the need to maintain a highly regulated environment at J&J meant that very
detailed processes were often implemented to meet compliance and government regulatory
requirements, thus demonstrating a strong focus on the importance of means versus ends. A
practitioner at J&J comments on the comprehensive processes involved in J&J’s planning cycle:
“J&J has very rigorous management-by-objective planning processes in terms of
stock purchase, fulfillment, and financial business planning processes. Those
processes are extremely important and they have to be followed to a point where
they become check-the-box regimes. But you have to do it in order to show that
you're satisfying compliance requirements.”
One of the defining characteristics of LSS is the importance the methodology places on
having consistent processes and using the appropriate quantity and quality of data to make
decisions. Oftentimes, a significant data collection process is required to meet the minimum
quantitative and qualitative requirements, followed by a rigorous data analysis process to identify
root causes and trends. Each and every step of the process is analyzed to identify potential
bottlenecks, inconsistencies, misinterpretations, and sources of defects – which is another example

Huff Post, The J&J Credo – A Model for Corporate America That Would Make America Work https://www.huffpost.com/entry/responsible-capitalism_b_1125597
19
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of J&J recognizing the importance of LSS and the need to focus on means versus ends. A
leadership team member and practitioner at J&J comments on the guidance that was given to
practitioners to ensure they invested time in understanding their processes:
“We kind of try to force people to get big picture improvements versus little tiny
ones, and say there is a business case for doing this. But oftentimes we knew that
they were doing this [where] the savings were nebulous. And so it was really the
means weren't going to justify the ends in terms of the actual savings, but we knew
that it was the right thing to do, even just understanding your processes in terms of
where they start and where they stop and [what] the inputs [are].”
J&J’s Focus on ‘Ends’
J&J had a very complex and comprehensive business planning process in the late 2000s,
and various inefficiencies were identified within its demand planning, financial planning, sales
and operations planning, and manufacturing sub-processes within. For nearly two years, the
departments were unable to come together to address the inefficiencies as they were “heads-down”
within their own areas, focusing only on the means (i.e. their individual processes). Eventually,
the pressures exerted by reduced headcount and organizational re-structuring were the wakeup call
that J&J needed to shift its focus to the ends – that is, seeing the efficiencies they would gain in
the end if they invested in the hard work to re-engineer the business planning process. A
practitioner at J&J comments on the collaboration between teams while focusing on the ends:
“[They] said, ‘we're ready to talk about it now because we need to meet these
productivity targets’. It really opened their minds in terms of being able to
collaborate on a plan that was connected and not duplicate work. Because we
honestly were duplicating effort between business planning and sales and
operations planning. And by doing this work, I would say we took out 20% and
more across Finance, Sales, Marketing, and even Supply Chain that made our lives
easier by having that collaboration towards integrated business planning.”
As part of its performance management process, J&J shifted its focus in the late 2000s to
evaluate individual objectives not only by “what” was achieved, but also “how” the objectives
were achieved – thus applying a balanced approach to both means and ends. Sales and marketing

47
teams at J&J were often given aggressive monthly targets to meet, but the organization would
never condone the circumventing of processes or the breaking of rules to meet those targets.
Similarly, Finance teams had critical month-end, quarter-end, and year-end closing due dates to
meet, but all processes needed to follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and SOX
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act) requirements. A practitioner at J&J comments on J&J’s goal setting and
performance management process, where the means and ends were balanced:
“There's always a big, big focus on achieving the objectives, but it's also because
of the Credo, the way you do things… I've never seen the organization saying the
‘what’ is the only thing that matters, no matter what. There's a push to make it
happen, I mean we have results to deliver like product launches to deliver on time.
But [they would] never say that you don't have to do the right thing or that it doesn't
matter if we impact others or the external environment – there is always a
consideration.”
V.1.4 Summary of J&J’s Value Focus in General
A summary of the various examples where J&J generally focused on one competing value
versus another (within each Competing Values Framework dimension) can be found in Table 7
below:
Table 7: Summary of J&J’s Value Focus in General
Examples of J&J’s Focus on
Competing Value 1

Examples of J&J’s Focus on
Competing Value 2

Organizational
Focus
(People vs.
Organization)

People:
• Customized LSS training
and certification
• Leadership development
• Innovation, compliance,
and personal health
training

Organization:
• LSS project selection process
• Alignment with organizational
strategy and top priorities
• Living out the responsibilities in
the company “Credo”

Organizational
Structure
(Flexibility vs.
Control)

Flexibility:
• Changes in customer
expectations
• Importance of servant

Control:
• Changes required as a result of
the consent decree issued by the
U.S. FDA

Competing
Values
Dimension
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•

Organizational
Means and
Ends
(Means vs.
Ends)

leadership
Team collaboration to
achieve organizational
goals

Means:
• Ethical framework in
making business decisions
• Need to maintain highly
regulated environment to
meet compliance and
regulatory requirements
• Value placed in LSS
methodology
• Rigorous data collection
and analysis processes

•
•

Highly regulated environment
Safety measures and protocols
above and beyond minimum
requirements

Ends:
• Stepping out of “silos” to
recognize potential in
collaborating to achieve shared
goals
• Investing in hard work needed
to achieve process efficiencies
• Performance management
process (balance between means
and ends)

V.2 J&J’s Value Focus During the Process Excellence Program Lifecycle
We explore six distinct periods within J&J’s Process Excellence program lifecycle (as
shown in Figure 3 and listed below) and obtain an understanding of how J&J was able to organize
and manage competing values within each time period and successfully sustain its LSS program:
•

Period 1 (2002-2007): Implementation of the Process Excellence
Program at J&J/McNeil

•

Period 2 (2007-2008): J&J/McNeil/Pfizer Merger

•

Period 3 (2008-2011): Stabilization of the Process Excellence Program

•

Period 4 (2011-2013): Move of Process Excellence Program from
Corporate to Supply Chain

•

Period 5 (2013-2015): Discontinuation of Process Excellence Training

•

Period 6 (2015-2020): Discontinuation of the Process Excellence
Program
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V.2.1 Period 1 (2002-2007: Implementation of the Process Excellence Program at
J&J/McNeil)
Prior to the J&J/McNeil/Pfizer merger in 2007, both J&J and McNeil had launched
individual LSS programs within their own organizations – J&J’s in Montreal and McNeil’s in
Guelph. Both LSS programs were referred to as “Process Excellence” internally and began with a
significant investment in training of in-house Black Belts to lead large-scale LSS projects. The
Process Excellence journey at McNeil began around 2002 after the arrival of a new company
President (Jerry Norskog) who was a very strong proponent of the LSS methodology and culture.
External consultants were utilized for the training of three waves of Black Belts over the next five
years. The Process Excellence journey at J&J began around 2005 in a much smaller capacity
compared to McNeil, with a dedicated Black Belt manager leading LSS projects and implementing
a continuous improvement strategy for the Montreal site. It is to be noted that Pfizer did not have
an LSS or continuous improvement program.
People vs. Organization
With both J&J’s and McNeil’s implementation of their individual Process Excellence
programs, it was clear to see a stronger focus being made on people versus organization in terms
of competing values as demonstrated by the significant investment that each organization made in
their LSS training. Both organizations recognized the value in providing LSS training and capacity
building to existing staff members, so they could function as expert LSS practitioners within their
own departments. Within McNeil, the first wave of Black Belts consisted of the organization’s
Vice Presidents in addition to staff members reporting to the Vice Presidents, most of whom were
Directors. In addition to the significant time investment in this first wave of Black Belts, where
the program required each participant to dedicate four weeks of their time to in-class training, it
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was a significant resource investment with the 16 participants almost certainly commanding the
largest salaries within the organization.
If J&J and McNeil were each instead focusing more on the competing value of organization
versus people, an alternative approach of hiring external consultants to temporarily jump in and
lead their LSS projects would most likely have been considered. Process improvement benefits
perceivably would have been achieved within a shorter period of time, but the LSS knowledge and
expertise gained during that short period would most likely disappear with the completion of the
external consultant contracts with J&J or McNeil. Investing in the LSS training of direct staff
members within J&J and McNeil as Black Belt leaders laid the foundation for a sustainable LSS
program. A leadership team member and practitioner comments on the first wave of Black Belts
trained at McNeil:
“So you got a fairly high-level, high-value group that you're taking out of the
organization for four weeks. So there was certainly a huge investment. But the other
thing too is it kind of created the cascade effect, because Jerry [Norskog] was very
good at rewarding those people. And some people were actually bitter that they
didn't get selected. And so, in the town hall meetings, there would be, ‘well, is there
going to be a wave two [of Black Belts]?’”
Flexibility vs. Control
Another key decision that both J&J and McNeil had to make when implementing their
Process Excellence programs was whether a centralized Process Excellence team would be
established within each of their organizations. A centralized team would signify a stronger focus
on the competing value of control versus flexibility, as all Process Excellence projects would be
managed centrally by a small team of LSS-trained staff members. Greater controls on both LSS
project selection and the standardized application of LSS methodology within the projects would
also foreseeably be attained with the existence of a centralized Process Excellence team. Both J&J
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and McNeil made the decision to establish dedicated Process Excellence teams within their
organizations, staffed by LSS-trained Black Belts to coordinate all Process Excellence activities.
The alternate decision, focusing on flexibility versus control, would have meant each
department within J&J and McNeil not being constrained by the organizational LSS project
selection process. They could each decide to dedicate specific department resources directly to the
LSS projects they chose to take on, and could either ramp up or slow down their LSS capacity
building based on changing customer requirements, thus being more dynamic as a result. This
alternate decision was viewed as being the long-term approach for the Process Excellence journey
within both J&J and McNeil, as it wasn’t possible at the time to provide LSS training to all staff
members at the initial onset of the Process Excellence programs due to the significant time and
resource investment required. A leadership team member comments on the dilemma in deciding
whether a centralized Process Excellence team would be the best solution:
“I think that some of the tension was whether Process Excellence was a competency
within every department or should [it] be a different department… For example,
do you set up a digital marketing team or do you expect every marketer to be
digitally savvy?... So the philosophy becomes: do you make it as an organizational
resource? Or do you give the competency to everybody in the organization that
would become the DNA of the organization? That is the conflict we had.”
Means vs. Ends
For both J&J and McNeil, the main objective in implementing an LSS program was to
improve process efficiencies and reduce costs within each of their organizations. To achieve these
objectives while focusing more on the competing value of ends versus means, an organization may
choose to forego the LSS program implementation entirely and instead look at re-structuring the
organization to significantly reduce headcount and thus achieve immediate cost savings. However,
a significant reduction in headcount would go against one of J&J’s Credo commitments to its
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employees: “[Our employees] must have a sense of security, fulfillment and purpose in their
jobs.”20.
As demonstrated by their decision in implementing a Process Excellence program within
each of their organizations, both J&J and McNeil placed a greater focus on the competing value
of means versus ends at the onset of their Process Excellence journeys. The approach and way
forward to improve process efficiencies and reduce costs within each of their organizations must
be grounded and validated by the appropriate data-based decisions, even though this would take a
significantly longer period of time. With the multitude of examples where LSS had been
successfully implemented in large-scale manufacturing environments within the last few decades,
J&J and McNeil were confident that LSS could also be effective within their own manufacturing
environments.
Management of Competing Values in Period 1
A summary of how J&J (per-merger) and McNeil managed the competing values of people
versus organization, flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 1 (the
implementation of the Process Excellence program at J&J/McNeil) is found below in Figure 4:

20

Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo - https://www.jnj.com/credo/

53

Figure 4: Management of Competing Values in Period 1

V.2.2 Period 2 (2007-2008: J&J/McNeil/Pfizer Merger)
This was a period of significant change with the merger of three large-scale organizations
(J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer) into one (under J&J). J&J was originally based in Montreal, with its
office operations managing brands such as J&J, Aveeno, Neutrogena, and Clean & Clear within
Canada. As a result of the merger, all J&J Consumer Healthcare office operations roles (with the
exception of one or two teleworking roles) were moved to J&J’s new headquarters office in
Markham. McNeil was based in Guelph, with its office operations managing brands such as
Tylenol, Motrin, and Imodium within Canada. Some of McNeil Consumer Healthcare’s office
operations roles were moved to J&J’s new headquarters office as a result of the merger, while
other office operations roles remained in Guelph (due to their proximity to McNeil’s plant
operations). Pfizer was based in Markham, with its office operations managing brands such as
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Listerine, Benadryl, and Reactine within Canada. Pfizer’s office location became the new
headquarters office for the three merged organizations, and thus their office operations roles would
not require a physical move.
As a result of the merger, the individual Process Excellence programs within J&J
(Montreal) and McNeil would now merge as a singular Process Excellence program under J&J in
Markham. A dedicated Process Excellence team based at the new J&J headquarters office in
Markham was now established, with a Director (originally from McNeil) and two Black Belt direct
reports (both who were new to J&J). The reporting structure of the Process Excellence team was
under the Corporate department of J&J, reporting to the Chief Financial Officer who was also a
J&J board member.
People vs. Organization
As is typically expected with large-scale company mergers, a significant degree of turnover
occurred as a result of the J&J/McNeil/Pfizer merger. The move of physical locations (from
Montreal to Markham and Guelph to Markham) for certain roles was a key factor for many staff
members in their decision to either stay or part ways with the merged organization. As many roles
were now vacated due to staff members deciding not to stay on (either because of the physical
move required or for other reasons), J&J focused on the competing value of people versus
organization during this time period to hire a significant number of new employees. A practitioner
at J&J comments on the multitude of personnel changes occurring during this time period:
“I would say the focus was very much on people versus organization because
during that time, there was an enormous amount of turnover between bringing
people together from different sites and then hiring. And there was a moment where
they asked ‘who's new at J&J?’ and a third of the company put their hand up…
And so ‘people’ is an enormous focus – they really were trying to work hard to
maintain the talent that they had and not lose it.”
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When implementing an LSS program, an organization must make a decision between
hiring external LSS-trained consultants to lead its Belt projects or investing in large-scale LSS
capacity building efforts (assuming the organization does not yet have a sufficient number of LSStrained staff members). J&J chose the latter option, hiring two Black Belts as full-time Process
Excellence team members to manage and facilitate the LSS capacity-building efforts for the
organization, including the training of Red Belts and Green Belts. This decision to use in-house
training resources facilitated J&J’s ability to train a large number of employees across the entire
organization, and thus demonstrating its ability to scale the Process Excellence program. A
leadership team member and practitioner comments on the benefits realized from the decision to
invest in in-house trainers:
“If we had had to go outside and pay consultants fees every time we wanted to
train, [the] number of individuals trained would have been greatly reduced. The
large number of individuals trained was one of the reasons the program was
successful. The flexibility to call upon dedicated internal trainers was key… It
would have been not feasible to layer [Process Excellence] training onto someone’s
existing role and carry out the number of training sessions that were delivered.”
The focus for the merged organization also shifted to the importance of organization as a
competing value versus people. The entire organizational culture was now immediately changing
for each of these three organizations (J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer) as they melded into one. Which
cultural aspects of the organization would remain, and which would dissipate or be molded into
new ways of working? Which of the three organizations would take the lead in modeling and
influencing norms and behaviors for the new organization? Leaders from each of the three
individual organizations were “jockeying for position” in the new organization, as they went
through their “forming-storming-norming-performing”21 experiences as a new peer group. The
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influence from both J&J and McNeil in having successful Process Excellence programs within
each of their organizations was an explicit factor in the merged organization’s decision to continue
having an LSS program, as Pfizer had not yet implemented an LSS program within their
organization. A practitioner at J&J comments on the changing organizational culture at the onset
of the merger:
“They were definitely more on the organizational [side] because it was really a
juggernaut taking on a juggernaut. There were quite a few cultural elements that
were also coming into play – people referring to ‘well, are you legacy J&J, or are
you legacy Pfizer?’. So I think their strategy was more to be overly inclusive in
working together to knit those two juggernauts into one… The other piece is that
there [were] just so many processes to connect that it really did take a village.”
Flexibility vs. Control
With the merger of three large-scale organizations, a critical area of focus was the
standardization of foundational business processes – and thus the importance of control versus
flexibility in terms of competing values. To J&J’s customers such as Shoppers Drug Mart, Costco,
and Walmart, it would be unfair to expect them to embrace and manage three different “go-tomarket” processes post-merger (i.e. maintaining the go-to-market pre-merger processes from J&J,
McNeil, and Pfizer). Thus, a significant undertaking was led by the newly formed Process
Excellence team in Markham to document, codify, assess, prioritize, and standardize over 40
foundational end-to-end business processes. A leadership team member comments on the largescale process standardization project that was carried out:
“We were trying to merge three different companies into one company, and none
of the processes that are understood are documented… We ranked them, we
assessed the health of all the processes, and took 40 processes to work on… When
your $200 million company becomes an $800 million company [with] three
different cultures, three different processes, you had to have a lot more horsepower
to work through so many processes because each company was very keen on their
[own] process… If you have multiple processes, you can't automate.”
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In addition to standardizing J&J’s go-to-market processes, the importance of internal
financial controls forced the merged organization to focus on control versus flexibility in terms of
competing values. As a result of the three large-scale organizations each having different financial
management processes, the merged J&J organization unfortunately failed its SOX audit as the
internal controls were deemed inadequate. Shareholders’ resources needed to be protected
appropriately, with proper controls in place to manage organizational investments and spending
while preventing the potential for fraud or wastage. In addition, J&J was a decentralized
organization, and thus internal controls needed to be instituted to allow individuals managing the
business the leeway to focus on strategic initiatives. A large-scale Process Excellence project
focused on the implementation of SOX controls was immediately implemented as a result of the
failed SOX audit. A leadership team member at J&J comments on the importance of internal
controls, and how LSS tools and methodology played a valuable role in this area:
“If you don't have a really good control environment, the senior management and
leadership cannot delegate… The CEO and CFO of the company were able to
make decisions on brand and investments, whether to invest in Tylenol or
Listerine… But once you don't have that kind of a framework or control, then you
need to approve everything because you don't have the controls and checks and
balances in the system and accountability… And that is how we establish the
control through SOPs22, through policies, through procedures, and welldocumented processes. And then also understanding what is the RACI23 - what is
the role and responsibility of each individual.”
Means vs. Ends
At the onset of the J&J/McNeil/Pfizer merger, things were extremely hectic across the
entire organization, with leadership teams focusing on business-critical foundational processes and
internal financial controls, as mentioned previously. There unfortunately wasn’t any bandwidth
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available at this time to conduct a deep-dive analysis on the detailed Sales and Marketing processes
from each of the three organizations. Sales teams were simply being asked to achieve their monthly
sales and profit targets, and given leeway around how to do so as long as they were managing to
stay afloat within their markets. Thus, there was clearly a stronger focus on the ends versus the
means in terms of competing values during this period. A leadership team member and practitioner
from J&J comments on the potential for the Process Excellence program to later be applied to sales
and marketing processes:
“There could have been huge savings in marketing and Jerry [Norskog] was one
of these people that believed [Process Excellence] could be applied to everywhere.
So that's why he included sales and marketing – it wasn't just for window dressing…
There was an opportunity to be more efficient in how we spent money in terms of
advertising and how we sold and all that. So people really believed that the ends
were going to more than justify this time commitment of the senior people.”
Although the focus within Sales and Marketing was more on ends versus means during this
time period, there was still a critical focus on the importance of values and ethics as guided by
J&J’s Credo. A significant factor in determining performance bonuses for Sales team members
(similar to other Fortune 500 organizations) was whether they “hit their numbers” (i.e. achieved
the ends). But it was just as important to look at the means (i.e. how the ends were achieved) to
confirm that Credo practices were being followed, teams were working in collaboration, and
employees were respecting their colleagues when carrying out their work. A leadership team
member at J&J comments on the importance of both means and ends, and the influence of J&J’s
Credo and Process Excellence on ways of working:
“Means versus the ends – I think both are important... And you cannot just justify
improper means to achieve good end results… So you need to enforce to people the
values of the organization and that everybody has that Credo integrity in their
DNA. And then they subscribe to it and think ‘If I can do this, what is the implication
to the organization? Am I doing the right thing to get through this order?’. Also
how leadership walks the talk – leadership can put some values and mission
statements on the wall, but if they don't act like that, then everybody else will ignore
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the values… So that's where the process was where PE24 helped us to get to the
right balance between means and ends.”
Management of Competing Values in Period 2
A summary of how J&J managed the competing values of people versus organization,
flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 2 (the J&J/McNeil/Pfizer merger)
is found below in Figure 5:

Figure 5: Management of Competing Values in Period 2
V.2.3 Period 3 (2008-2011: Stabilization of the Process Excellence Program)
During this period, both the Process Excellence program and the J&J organization as a
whole were establishing a good rhythm in terms of their operations and ways of working. Staff
members were now “settling in” and embracing the culture of the merged organization, no longer
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focusing on individual processes from pre-merger J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer days. As an
organization, J&J had now successfully passed the “forming” and “storming” stages of group
dynamics and was now moving to “norming” and “performing”25. Customers and vendors were
now experiencing single, standardized processes in working with the merged organization versus
patchwork processes and workarounds experienced in earlier days.
The Process Excellence Team was now ready to fully launch their training program across
the entire organization, eagerly welcoming staff members from any and all teams and departments
to enroll in the training and join the Process Excellence community of practice. As Red Belt and
Green Belt projects were launched, implemented, and completed, word was quickly spreading
about the value the Process Excellence program was bringing to the organization. An annual
“Process Excellence Oscars” event provided an opportunity to showcase various Belt projects that
were either in-flight or completed, with a fun, peer-nominated award component to recognize
standout accomplishments. A practitioner at J&J comments on the thriving LSS culture within the
J&J organization during this period:
“In this time period, I recall many more communications around Process
Excellence – much more education and training around Lean Six Sigma, Design
Excellence, critical thinking. They were very open to making those trainings
available to the organization as opposed to a select few. This is where they really
allowed the methodologies to flourish as part of our way of doing things.”
People vs. Organization
The formation of a Process Excellence Leadership Team during this period was a key factor
behind the successful stabilization of J&J’s Process Excellence program. The Chief Financial
Officer (Sukumar Natarajan) and Chief Information Officer (Linda Champagne) were cochampions of the Process Excellence Leadership Team, and they leaned heavily on the leaders of
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each Global Business Unit (Baby & Beauty, Over-The-Counter, and Consumer Healthcare) to
embrace the Process Excellence culture within each of their teams. The Process Excellence
Leadership Team understood the value behind having a process view of the merged organization,
listening to staff and customer feedback, and addressing integration pain points across the
organization through LSS training and capacity-building. A brief training program for Process
Champions was also developed at this time, and delivered by the Process Excellence team to
leadership team members across the organization. A practitioner at J&J comments on how the
strong support of the Process Excellence Leadership Team helped to facilitate the organization’s
focus on the competing value of people versus organization during this period:
“[The members of the Process Excellence Leadership Team] were interested in
how we could take away the pain of the merged company. So that helped lead to
stabilization… We can only run so fast if we train other people, so they can run too
and you get more capabilities. They were very supportive of that with that context,
so they had to go out and drive value quickly. So from that perspective, it was a
focus on people because they were trying to listen to the pain the employees were
having from the Credo survey from a customer perspective. And they realized that
investment in people is going to help in that.”
In addition to buying in to the overall approach of the Process Excellence program, the
Process Excellence Leadership Team members were strong voices in advocating for their team
members to enroll in and complete the Belt training provided by the Process Excellence in-house
Black Belts. They played an active role in identifying potential Belt candidates to nominate, in
addition to recommending specific pain points for the Belt candidates to address through their Red
Belt or Green Belt projects in conjunction with their training. As committing to the completion of
a Belt project would typically be above and beyond the Belts’ original job responsibilities, the
Process Excellence Leadership Team members would also play a role in removing potential
roadblocks for their respective Belts and re-prioritizing existing workloads to free up time and reallocate it for LSS work with their project teams. To increase accountability and demonstrate the
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importance of these commitments, Belts were encouraged to document their Process Excellence
training and project work as part of their individual goals and objectives. This was another example
of the organization focusing more on people versus organization as a competing value during this
time period. Staff members also had the option of pursuing Belt certification, which would be
granted by the Process Excellence team upon validation of their project completion and appropriate
application of the Belt’s LSS knowledge, skills, and capabilities. In addition to the “Process
Excellence Oscars” event mentioned previously, staff members with completed Belt projects had
the opportunity to showcase their work with J&J board members and other leadership team
members. A leadership team member and practitioner comments on the support from J&J
leadership during this time period:
“So people were rewarded for doing it [taking on LSS training and working on a
Belt project]… People put things on their objectives, so people would do it. Now,
the downside is they often didn't finish the project, but certainly it was an
expectation… It was on your objectives to do this – you had to if you wanted to be
kind of seen in the organization – that is, somebody that can do more than just your
day-to-day job. This was a skillset that they wanted you to have.”
Flexibility vs. Control
When distinguishing between the various Belt designations within Lean or Six Sigma, it is
usually the case that Green Belts and Black Belts are the ones responsible for leading Lean or Six
Sigma projects26. Individuals completing the Green Belt training program at J&J were required to
participate in two weeks of in-class training, and would have the option to continue as a Black Belt
and complete an additional four weeks of in-class training. To achieve significant scale within a
relatively short period of time, it would not have been feasible to enroll all Belt candidates in Green
Belt training based on the significant time investment required. Instead, a customized two-day Red
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Belt training program focusing mainly on the process tools of the Green Belt training program
(and excluding the more complex statistical tools) was a way to introduce both flexibility (versus
control) and scaling potential to J&J’s Process Excellence program. Offerings were usually
scheduled with the second day of the training occurring one month after the first day (instead of
as two consecutive days), and participants were provided the option of enrolling in different waves
(i.e. starting day one with one wave and completing day two with another), thus maximizing the
flexibility for scheduling and completion. A practitioner at J&J comments on the introduction of
the Red Belt training program during this period of J&J’s Process Excellence program:
“This is where they included Red Belt just to make it more accessible so that
everyone had [an alternate path] to putting in the amount of time and attention in
getting to a Green Belt certification level. So I think they were very open and
flexible in their approach to how to bring the most good to the most amount of
people in the organization through these methodologies.”
In terms of organizational processes and how J&J was functioning from a revenue and
expense perspective, higher expectations were being made of J&J by its overarching global
organization (based in New Brunswick, New Jersey), now that the merger was considered to be in
stabilization mode. A significant change in the J&J leadership team occurred as a result – with
each Global Business Unit leader now managing their own P&Ls versus J&J’s President managing
a singular P&L. Thus, a major shift resulted in Global Business Units now controlling their own
brand and marketing expenses, with additional rigor and scrutiny at a deeper level within the
organization. This demonstrated J&J’s focus on control versus flexibility in terms of competing
values, and strengthened the rationale for having more Red Belts trained to help maintain process
controls. A practitioner at J&J comments on the shift to having more controls during this period
of the Process Excellence lifecycle:
“They started to shift because they knew they were flying by the seat of their pants
from a flexibility perspective. They started to shift more for control, but it wasn't
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all the way there. And Corporate also was expecting more from JJI27 in this
timeframe. So they started to dive deeper into the P&L and control certain levers.
And that's where you saw the leadership change from one leader to three leaders
in JJI controlling the whole P&L… So it was more on the control side of things.”
Means vs. Ends
Although the ultimate goal of the Process Excellence program was to improve process
efficiencies and reduce costs, the more important objective during this period was to bring
awareness to the Process Excellence program in general. The LSS culture was rapidly evolving at
this time, and there were still quite a few employees who hadn’t yet been exposed to the LSS
terminology, methodology, and tools. As part of its change management approach, it was critical
for J&J to identify and secure early LSS “cheerleaders”, and continuously build out the program.
“Lunch-and-Learn” drop-in sessions were now implemented and regularly made available by the
Process Excellence team so that anyone could attend if they simply wanted to learn a new LSS
tool or concept within a short period of time, without having to commit to a two-day Red Belt or
ten-day Green Belt training program. This demonstrated the importance that J&J placed on the
means versus the ends in terms of competing values, as achieving process improvements and cost
reductions would not be immediately possible. A practitioner at J&J comments on the growth of
the LSS culture during this period of the Process Excellence program:
“I think it was more on the means where it was more about training, making people
aware, and giving people the tools… It was more focused on the level of awareness
and breeding familiarity with Six Sigma in the organization versus the optimized
and improved processes that would have come out of Green Belt certification
projects or Black Belt certification projects.”
Related to the above, J&J’s Process Excellence program lacked a standard process to
ensure the completion of its Red Belt projects. Over half of the Red Belt projects initiated at J&J
unfortunately did not meet their expected deadline date for completion, which was set at one year
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after the completion of day one of the Red Belt training. Some of the reasons behind this were to
be expected though – such as changes in employees’ roles within the organization, departures of
employees from the organization, and changing department or organizational priorities. This
demonstrated the lack of focus on the ends versus the means in terms of competing values, as more
of an emphasis was placed on building the Belt “pipeline” of candidates. A practitioner at J&J
comments on some of the reasons behind the lower-than-anticipated Red Belt project completion
rates:
“There were a lot of people that did the training, but didn't do the project – or the
project died or there wasn't a system or a mechanism to ensure it was completed. I
felt like it got off to a good start and then dropped off… There were numbers that
needed to be met or it was something on a management goal and putting people on
projects. And if they're not super-interested, they're going to do it to say they did it
– but if there's no consequences at the end or if there's no real reward at the end,
what's in it for them to complete it?”
Management of Competing Values in Period 3
A summary of how J&J managed the competing values of people versus organization,
flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 3 (stabilization of the Process
Excellence Program) is found below in Figure 6:
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Figure 6: Management of Competing Values in Period 3

V.2.4 Period 4 (2011-2013: Move of Process Excellence Program from Corporate to
Supply Chain)
J&J had now been a merged organization for four years, with its Process Excellence
program considered to be fully stabilized during this period. Expectations from J&J’s global
Corporate office on its revenue performance continued to increase, as the J&J/McNeil/Pfizer
merger was to have been fully executed by this time. The mandate of the Process Excellence team
was to implement an LSS culture and provide capacity building to the integrated organization such
that each department would have LSS-trained Belts within to be able to lead their own process
improvement projects. This mandate, for the most part, was now considered by the global
Corporate office to be complete, and thus it was difficult for the Chief Financial Officer to provide
rationale for the Process Excellence team to continue functioning in its current capacity. There
was, however, a strong need within the Supply Chain department to apply LSS methodology to
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addressing pain points identified within its logistics, demand planning, and scheduling processes.
Thus, the one remaining member of the Process Excellence team (one of the Black Belts) moved
from supporting the entire J&J organization as a Corporate resource to now only supporting the
Supply Chain department.
During this period of the Process Excellence program, J&J (mainly on the manufacturing
side) was also grappling with the consent decree that had been issued by the U.S. FDA. This
significantly slowed down much of the Process Excellence efforts within the McNeil plant, and
J&J as a whole shifted its focus to improving reliability, customer service, and delivery
performance – as these areas were negatively impacted as a result of the consent decree.
Manufacturing sites outside of J&J were able to re-focus their efforts on LSS fairly quickly after
the consent decree to address the root causes of compliance issues – but it took much longer for
the McNeil plant to re-energize its LSS efforts.
People vs. Organization
J&J as a global organization was experiencing a significant shift in its operations being
managed at a regional level (from its Corporate headquarters in New Brunswick) versus locally
(for example, within J&J in Markham) during this time period. At the end of the 2000s, J&J’s
Supply Chain department had already shifted to being managed regionally, and the next
departments to follow this approach were now its Finance and HR departments. This was a clear
example of J&J was now focusing more on organization versus people as a competing value, being
strongly governed by its global Corporate office. A practitioner at J&J comments on the impact of
the global Corporate office’s expectations on the Process Excellence program:
“So that was really where I think the Corporate pressure was becoming very
granular and it was becoming overwhelming from a PE perspective… This was
four years after merger and Corporate finally had enough and said ‘look, you're
merged, it's done now – you don't need this resource doing what it's doing’. And
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the flip really started to happen then where it moved from [being] less on the people
side and the training investment [and more] into the organization side.”
Flexibility vs. Control
Prior to the move of the Process Excellence role from Corporate to Supply Chain, the
projects led by the Black Belt team members covered all parts of the organization. For example,
leaders from the Sales, Marketing, and Digital departments would regularly engage the Process
Excellence team to implement large-scale LSS projects within their areas. With the Process
Excellence function now being moved to Supply Chain, the majority of the projects (70-80%) were
now Supply Chain LSS projects such as those focused on service availability and unit fill rates.
The Process Excellence team no longer had direct involvement in J&J’s end-to-end processes, and
thus a lack of flexibility in the types of projects they could take on. Customers of the Process
Excellence team similarly now lacked the flexibility in managing their own processes with the
shift to regionally managed functions. A practitioner at J&J comments on the changing dynamics
within the organization, with J&J focusing more on control versus flexibility as a competing value
during this period:
“Everything else was moving centrally during 2011 to 2013. So again, another
element of control that meant that the customers of PE weren't given the flexibility
to say, ‘Here's how I want to go to market’. They were told, ‘No, this is how you go
to market. This is your new process now top-down from Corporate and [there’s]
no room for discussion about change management or process improvement – here
it is, live with it.’”
Means vs. Ends
As a result of the consent decree issued by the U.S. FDA to McNeil, J&J was forced into
changing its manufacturing work environment to be focused more on the ends (i.e. fulfilling the
requirements of the consent decree) versus the means in terms of competing values. A majority of
the Process Excellence Belt projects were immediately halted, and newer productivity projects
were postponed for consideration until all requirements of the consent decree were met. All process
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improvement work related to production, R&D, and quality within McNeil was immediately
placed on hold as mandated by the external auditors. Any changes in process design or operation
would require a lengthy and detailed screening approval by the local auditors before proceeding.
A practitioner at J&J comments on the significant impact the consent decree had on the Process
Excellence program:
“[The consent decree] forced big changes in the Lean Six Sigma program,
especially in manufacturing sites. So a lot of the programs, like 5S28 for example, a
quick changeover was stopped because there was a perceived hurdle in educating
the FDA about the benefits of that from a compliance perspective, and it was seen
as a distraction from the compliance reading that was being enforced. At the time
it was the right thing for the organization to do, but it set back the program
probably by a decade.”
Management of Competing Values in Period 4
A summary of how J&J managed the competing values of people versus organization,
flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 4 (the move of the Process
Excellence program from Corporate to Supply Chain) is found below in Figure 7:
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Figure 7: Management of Competing Values in Period 4

V.2.5 Period 5 (2013-2015: Discontinuation of Process Excellence Training)
With the continual pressures each department in J&J was experiencing in terms of
managing their P&Ls, it wasn’t surprising to see the lack of appetite from leaders in supporting
Process Excellence training requests from their staff members during this time period. To fill the
minimum number of seats within their Red Belt and Green Belt training programs leading up to
this period, J&J had to reach out to other Johnson & Johnson affiliates (for example, in J&J Pharma
and J&J Medical Devices). It took quite a bit of convincing by the Process Excellence team to
garner support for the final training program that was completed – a Black Belt “bridge” program
meant to prepare Green Belts for Black Belt certification. Within the Supply Chain department
specifically, the department had achieved success in addressing the issues related to service
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reliability, and were now shifting their focus to cost reduction and the exploration of offshoring
and outsourcing opportunities.
The initiatives associated with the consent decree in the McNeil plant had now successfully
wrapped up, and the production of Over-The-Counter products had now moved to the Consumer
Healthcare division. Process Excellence projects at McNeil were fairly light during this period,
due to project resources being deployed to work on a significant physical expansion at the plant
that was to bring better segregation and controls as they related to production equipment and
security protocols. The project took three years to complete (from 2012 to 2015).
People vs. Organization
The shift from locally-managed processes to regionally-managed ones was now ramping
up significantly for the Finance and HR departments, managed by a large-scale project called
Enterprise Standards and Productivity. Standardized processes at the organizational level were
being mandated by J&J’s global Corporate office in New Brunswick. The standardized processes
laid the groundwork for a future ERP (enterprise resource planning) system to be implemented
(the next version of SAP29) which was globally led and required global standard templates to be
utilized. This demonstrated J&J’s focus on organization versus people in terms of competing
values during this time period. A practitioner at J&J comments on the changes brought about by
the Enterprise Standards and Productivity project:
“So that is where a lot of the leadership functions were stripped away in Canada,
as they were centralized in the US. A lot of the process determinations were now
set in from Corporate… So very much an even stronger focus on organization
versus people. They were very willing and they did – they shed a lot of talent at JJI
– very seasoned, very strong enterprise leaders, but they had no role for them in
the future organization.”
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Flexibility vs. Control
The Sales and Marketing departments were now also beginning their transformation from
being locally-managed entities to regionally-managed ones. As a result, the P&Ls for the Global
Business Units would now be fully controlled by J&J’s global Corporate office in New Brunswick,
signifying a strong focus on control versus flexibility in terms of competing values. J&J would
previously develop all local content and local copy, including locally managed websites. With the
shift to regional management, the bulk of this work would now move to J&J Corporate teams in
the U.S., as all copy, brand artwork, and insights were now globally managed. The Sales and
Marketing departments in J&J would now only manage the smaller localization portion of the
process – for example, ensuring the French copy would work in Quebec and validating whether
content would be appropriate in context for the audience in Canada. A practitioner at J&J
comments on the impact of the various J&J departments shifting to a centralized, regional control:
“Canada was turning into a satellite office in name and spirit – the value was really
focused on control. So basically, the central office could peer into every single
aspect of the organization starting from a P&L lens… If it's centrally dictated,
you're not doing any process work anymore – you’re just lifting and applying,
you’re working through change management, which basically meant if they don't
go along with it, we hope people will self-select out.”
Means vs. Ends
As a result of both the consent decree and the shift of control to regionally-managed
functions, the McNeil plant was experiencing much more oversight and involvement from J&J’s
global Corporate offices in New Brunswick during this period. The global Corporate offices had
recently launched a new large-scale program called “Make to Win”, which was focused on
improving operational efficiencies within its manufacturing sites around the world. The McNeil
plant was chosen as either the second or third plant within Johnson & Johnson for the program to
be run, and thus this was still during the early stages of the program’s global rollout. One of the

73
key metrics the program focused on was operational efficiency, which is defined as “the ability of
an organization to reduce waste in time, effort and materials as much as possible, while still
producing a high-quality service or product”30. Due to a number of factors, the operational
efficiency in the McNeil plant had dropped from 40% to 20% in the last few years, and the global
Corporate office was now demanding an increase in operational efficiency to 70% through the
Make to Win program. This was an example of the organization focusing more on ends versus
means in terms of competing values, as the Make to Win program was unfortunately not fully
applying the LSS methodology (the means) to capture sufficient data, analyze and understand the
detailed process, heed the advice of resident experts, and determine the true capability of the
process. A leadership team member and practitioner at J&J comments on the challenges
experienced by the Make to Win program during this time period:
“When they implemented Make to Win, there was a lot of other reasons and
implications. The efficiencies actually in Guelph deteriorated rapidly… They would
come in and say, ‘Okay, well, your OE31's going to go to 70%’. I go, ‘It's not
possible. Our run sizes are too small to do that.’… So they had these crazy end
goals that were just so stretched – they weren't really realistic… I'm all for stretch
goals, but I'm also pragmatic and say if you set goals that are totally unachievable,
you know that people are literally not going to try.”
Management of Competing Values in Period 5
A summary of how J&J managed the competing values of people versus organization,
flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 5 (the discontinuation of Process
Excellence training) is found below in Figure 8:

TechTarget, Search Business Analytics, Definition – Operational Efficiency https://searchbusinessanalytics.techtarget.com/definition/operationalefficiency#:~:text=Operational%20efficiency%20is%20the%20ability,high%2Dquality%20service%20or%20produ
ct.
31
OE = Operational Efficiency
30
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Figure 8: Management of Competing Values in Period 5

V.2.6 Period 6 (2015-2020: Discontinuation of the Process Excellence Program)
Although there were still some Process Excellence projects being carried out in the McNeil
plant, there were no further transactional (i.e. non-manufacturing) Process Excellence projects in
J&J. In fact, this was not only the case at J&J, but also across the Sales and Marketing
organizations in all other Johnson & Johnson affiliate companies. The organization shifted its
focus to other areas within the supply chain process during this time period, moving into the
planning, sourcing, delivering, and enabling processes of the product lifecycle. In addition, the
Process Excellence role within J&J’s Supply Chain department had since transitioned to another
staff member, but the Process Excellence function was no longer part of this role, signifying the
end of the Process Excellence program at J&J.

75
On the manufacturing side, several new programs were being introduced during this time
period (including the continuation of the Make to Win program mentioned during the prior period).
Agile methodology was now added to the Make to Win program with the introduction of twice
daily “stand-up meetings”32 in the McNeil plant and re-structuring their work to follow a “scrum”
framework33. In addition to the stand-up meetings (also referred to as “quick huddles”), staff
members within the Consumer organization in the U.S. were encouraged to apply concepts such
as co-location, iterative management, and empowering decision-making at the lowest level of the
organization. Another program called “Manufacturing for the Future” was also introduced in the
U.S. during this time period, looking at the intersection of innovation and technology “to address
flexibility, agility, access, and affordability”34. The Information Technology organization in the
U.S. also rolled out a new program called “Rapid Value Realization”, which borrows heavily from
Lean, Design Thinking, and Agile.
People vs. Organization
Although J&J’s Process Excellence program had been demonstrating value to the
organization through the success of its completed Belt projects, continual pressure was being
placed on each J&J affiliate organization to meet profit and revenue targets set by the global
Corporate office. The decision to focus on organization versus people in terms of competing values
meant that J&J’s Process Excellence program would officially be sunsetted, resulting in the
discontinuation of LSS best practice-sharing among affiliates. The decision to discontinue J&J’s
Process Excellence program was also the direct result of Process Excellence project demand on

32

Kanbanize, Stand-up Meeting: The Definite Guide for Holding Effective Stand-ups https://kanbanize.com/blog/running-a-better-stand-up-meeting/
33
Scrum.org, What is Scrum? - https://www.scrum.org/resources/what-is-scrum
34
Pharma TechOps USA, Case Study: Manufacturing for the Future - https://www.pharma-techops-usa.com/casestudy-manufacturing-for-the-future-johnson-johnson
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the transactional side (i.e. outside of the manufacturing environment) drying up during this time
period. A practitioner at J&J comments on the difficult decisions resulting in the discontinuation
of the Process Excellence program:
“[The decision to sunset the Process Excellence program] showed that the
organization truly did not believe that Lean Six Sigma could contribute to the
bottom line in a positive way… The decision often comes down to ‘well, I can have
someone in head office who's working on developing talent or I can have a sales
rep grabbing revenue’, and those pressures came to bear… And definitely the
organizational pressure won out.”
Flexibility vs. Control
The new ERP system was now being deployed in J&J during this time period to standardize
all Finance and HR processes, based on global templates developed by the global Corporate offices
in the U.S. The Corporate Supply Chain organization in the U.S. was also continuing their efforts
in standardizing their processes across the globe with the introduction of the J&J Production
System, which later merged into the J&J Operating System. The various processes within these
areas were aligned with the standards that had been put in place in the U.S. through the ES&P and
transformation work that had happened previously, demonstrating a strong focus on control versus
flexibility in terms of competing values. A practitioner at J&J comments on the completion of the
process standardization work during this time period:
“It was at this point, a lot of standardization of processes, not just in JJI, but across
all of Supply Chain, and across all of Finance for all of Canada… So that was the
‘bow on the ribbon’ kind of thing to say – now it's ‘done done’. And a very strict
control of resourcing, a strict control of how those companies are expected to
operate and deliver results, and very, very regimented and controlled.”
Means vs. Ends
During this period, the Corporate Supply Chain organization in the U.S., referred to
internally as the Supply Chain Academy, had now become the central governing body for J&J’s
global Process Excellence program. The organization had previously created the J&J Production
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System to standardize all global supply chain processes. The Supply Chain Academy is a relatively
small group (approximately six employees) offering training and certification opportunities in the
areas of Lean, Six Sigma, Design Excellence, and general supply chain processes. Specific training
courses such as “Training Within Industry”, “Maintenance Scheduling & Execution”, and
“Negotiating for Mutual Gains” are also offered. Through the support of the Supply Chain
Academy, the McNeil plant has recently introduced a new LSS Yellow Belt program, with
mentoring support being provided by local Black Belts. This re-energized interest in the
application of LSS demonstrates J&J’s focus on means versus ends in terms of competing values
during this period. A practitioner at J&J comments on the impact of the Supply Chain Academy’s
management of the global Process Excellence program:
“The formation of the J&J Supply Chain Academy as the central governing body
for the PE program has driven accountability for certification and has allowed for
a high degree of standardization. The move from regional to centralized processes
has increased the quality of the training and support structure around
completion/certification. As a leader, it has allowed me to quickly build experts on
my team… These new skillsets have driven better problem solving, analytics
(especially in the areas of waste reduction) and improvements to reliability
metrics.”
Management of Competing Values in Period 6
A summary of how J&J managed the competing values of people versus organization,
flexibility versus control, and means versus ends within Period 6 (the discontinuation of the
Process Excellence program) is found below in Figure 9:
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Figure 9: Management of Competing Values in Period 6
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VI DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Drawing upon Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values Framework as our
theoretical framework, we carried out a retrospective, in-depth case study (Yin, 2014) of a Fortune
500 organization’s implementation and sustainment of its LSS program. We gain a detailed
understanding of how J&J organized and managed its LSS program to successfully sustain it over
time. We trace J&J’s changing focus on competing values through each phase of its Process
Excellence program lifecycle to reveal how it successfully sustained the program, how certain
activities and events played a role in the program’s discontinuation, and we propose ideas and
approaches for future revival of the program.
VI.1 Empirical Findings
We contribute to the existing literature by providing a detailed empirical account of how
J&J implemented and sustained its Process Excellence program over a period of 13 years (from
2002 to 2015). Previous empirical studies have showcased the application of LSS in specific
process improvement projects within both the private sector (Montgomery & Woodall, 2008;
Ahire & Jensen, 2017; Honda et al., 2018) and the INGO sector (Parris, 2013), in addition to its
versatility in specific projects within various industries (Bhat et al., 2020; Dileep et al., 2014; Wang
& Chen, 2010; Vijaya Sunder, 2016; Shamsuzzaman et al., 2018; Gijo et al., 2019; Antony et al.,
2016). However, there is a dearth of literature available on the long-term sustainment of an LSS
program within an organization.
We provide an account of how J&J organized and managed its LSS program successfully
over time through the application of Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values
Framework, consisting of three dimensions: (1) organizational focus (people versus organization),
(2) organizational structure (flexibility versus control), and (3) organizational means and ends
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(means versus ends). Table 8 below provides a summary of the events and activities demonstrating
J&J’s focus on competing values through each period of its LSS program:
Table 8: J&J’s Focus on Competing Values (Events and Activities)
Period of Process
Excellence
Program

Organizational
Focus

Organizational
Structure

Organizational
Means and Ends

Period 1:
Implementation of
the Process
Excellence
Program at
J&J/McNeil

People: J&J (premerger) and McNeil:
significant investment in
LSS training and
capacity building

Control: J&J (premerger) and McNeil:
implementation of
centralized LSS teams

Means: J&J (premerger) and McNeil:
decision to
implement LSS
program to reduce
costs

Period 2:
J&J/McNeil/
Pfizer Merger

People: Hiring of
significant number of
new roles, including 2
Black Belts for Process
Excellence team

Control:
Standardization of
foundational business
processes

Means: Importance
of ethics and values,
as guided by J&J’s
Credo

Period 3:
Stabilization of the
Process
Excellence
Program

Control:
Organization: Culture Implementation of
of newly merged J&J
internal financial
organization being
controls
formed

Ends: Leeway in
approach to achieve
sales and profit
targets

People: Formation of
Process Excellence
Leadership Team,
supporting LSS training

Means: Growth and
evolution of LSS
culture

People: Individual
Process Excellence
goals and objectives
supported by leadership
Period 4:
Move of Process
Excellence
Program from
Corporate to

Organization: Shift in
Supply Chain, Finance,
and HR to being
managed regionally vs.
locally

Flexibility:
Implementation of
customized Red Belt
training program

Means: Building
Control: More rigorous “pipeline” of Belt
P&L controls for Global candidates
Business Unit leaders
Control: Process
Excellence-led projects
mainly focused on
Supply Chain vs.
organization-wide

Ends: All LSS
efforts in McNeil
plant now diverted to
fulfilling
requirements of
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Supply Chain

consent decree

Period 5:
Discontinuation of
Process
Excellence
Training

Organization:
Implementation of
standardized ERP
system for Finance and
HR

Control: P&Ls for
Global Business Units
managed by Corporate
J&J in US

Ends: Achieving
operational
efficiencies, but not
fully applying LSS
methodology

Period 6:
Discontinuation of
Process
Excellence
Program

Organization: J&J’s
Process Excellence
program is officially
sunsetted

Control: Global
processes within all
departments now
standardized across all
J&J affiliate companies

Means: Reenergized interest in
LSS with re-launch
of Process Excellence
program in the US

VI.1.1 J&J’s Application of LSS Sustainment Guiding Principles in its Process Excellence
Program
Guiding principles for LSS sustainment have been presented in previous studies (Antony
et al., 2018; O’Reilly et al., 2018; Kloppenborg & Tesch, 2015; Lu et al., Laux, 2017), and we
share examples in Table 9 below where J&J demonstrated how it managed its LSS program and
focused on a particular competing value to apply the guiding principle. Where an example is not
referenced, we provide recommendations for how J&J may consider this with a future revival of
the Process Excellence program, or explain why the guiding principle may not be applicable to
J&J.
Table 9: LSS Sustainment Guiding Principles (and Application at J&J)
Source

Guiding Principle Demonstrated Reference / Opportunity / Explanation
at J&J?

Antony et al.,
2018

1. Alignment of
Lean Six Sigma
initiative with
organizational
strategy

Yes

•

•

Period 1 (focus on Means): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil:
decision to implement LSS
program to reduce costs
Period 2 (focus on Organization):
Culture of newly merged J&J
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organization being formed
2. Lean Six Sigma
project selection
and prioritization

Yes

•

Period 2 (focus on Organization):
Culture of newly merged J&J
organization being formed

3. Selection of top
talent for project
execution

Yes

•

Period 1 (focus on Control): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil –
implementation of centralized
LSS teams
Period 2 (focus on People):
Hiring of significant number of
new roles, including 2 Black Belts
for Process Excellence team
Period 3 (focus on Means):
Building “pipeline” of Belt
candidates

•

•

4. Leadership for
Lean Six Sigma

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process Excellence
Leadership Team, supporting LSS
training

5. Effective
training and design
of appropriate
curriculum for
different Lean Six
Sigma roles

Yes

•

Period 1 (focus on People): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil –
significant investment in LSS
training and capacity building
Period 3 (focus on Flexibility):
Implementation of customized
Red Belt training program

6. Development of
reward and
recognition system

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Individual Process Excellence
goals and objectives supported by
leadership

7. Lean Six Sigma
sustainability

Yes

•

See Figure 3 (Timeline of J&J’s
Process Excellence Program):
LSS program sustained for 13
years (from 2002 to 2015)

Yes (+No)

•

Period 1 (focus on People): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil –

8. Linking Lean
Six Sigma with

•
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organizational
learning and
innovation

•

•

O’Reilly et
al., 2018

•

significant investment in LSS
training and capacity building
Period 3 (focus on Flexibility):
Implementation of customized
Red Belt training program
Opportunity to link LSS with
innovation in future revival

9. Linking Lean
Six Sigma with
environment
management
system standards

Yes

10. Lean Six
Sigma and Big
Data

No

•

Opportunity to link LSS with big
data in future revival

Yes (+No)

•

General (focus on Flexibility):
Adjusting foundational processes
as a result of changes in customer
expectations
Opportunity to respond to
changing customer demands in a
more agile way in future revival

1. Need to respond
to increasingly
demanding
stakeholders

•

•

2. Aligning
implementation
with
organizational
strategy
3. Understanding
the role of internal
and external
specialists

Period 2 (focus on Control):
Standardization of foundational
business processes
Period 2 (focus on Control):
Implementation of internal
financial controls

Yes

•

[see Antony et al.’s guiding
principle #1 above]

Yes (+No)

•

Period 2 (focus on People):
Hiring of significant number of
new roles, including 2 Black Belts
for Process Excellence team
Period 3 (focus on Means):
Building “pipeline” of Belt
candidates
Opportunity to incorporate
external LSS specialists in future

•

•
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revival
4. Understanding
the structured
approach of LSS

Yes

•

•

Period 1 (focus on Means): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil:
decision to implement LSS
program to reduce costs
Period 2 (focus on Control):
Standardization of foundational
business processes

Kloppenborg
& Tesch,
2015

Highlighting the
key role and
behaviors of the
Project Champion

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process Excellence
Leadership Team, supporting LSS
training

Lu et al.,
2017

Incorporating key
components of
leadership,
statistical thinking,
continuous change,
and improvement

Yes

•

Period 1 (focus on Means): J&J
(pre-merger) and McNeil:
decision to implement LSS
program to reduce costs
Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process Excellence
Leadership Team, supporting LSS
training

•

VI.1.2 Potential Root Causes Behind the Discontinuation of J&J’s Process Excellence
Program
Potential root causes behind failures in LSS sustainment have also been presented in
previous studies (Drake et al., 2008; Antony et al., 2019; McLean & Antony, 2014; Fursule et al.,
2012; Sony et al., 2018), and we share examples in Table 10 below where J&J attempted to address
the potential root cause, focusing on a particular competing value while managing its LSS
program. Where an example is not referenced, we provide recommendations for how J&J may
consider this with a future revival of the Process Excellence program, or explain why the potential
root cause was not assessed as a part of this study.
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Table 10: Root Causes Behind Failures in LSS Sustainment (and Actions by J&J)
Source

Potential Root Cause

Antony et al.,
2019

1. There is employee’s
resistance to change

Root Cause
Addressed
by J&J?
Yes (+No)

Reference / Opportunity /
Explanation
•

•

Period 3 (focus on Means):
Growth and evolution of LSS
culture
Opportunity to enhance LSS
change management
approach in future revival

2. Lack of top
management
commitment in project
planning (resource
allocation)

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process
Excellence Leadership Team,
supporting LSS training

3. Lack of top
management
commitment in project
implementation
(monitoring and
controlling)

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process
Excellence Leadership Team,
supporting LSS training
Period 3 (focus on People):
Individual Process
Excellence goals and
objectives supported by
leadership

4. Lack of facilitators
with key positions in the
organization to ensure
management
commitment

Yes

•

Period 2 (focus on People):
Hiring of significant number
of new roles, including 2
Black Belts (and Director)
for Process Excellence team

5. The management does
not understand the causes
of employee’s resistance
of underperformance,
and does not take
immediate action

Yes (+No)

•

Period 3 (focus on Means):
Growth and evolution of LSS
culture
Opportunity to enhance LSS
change management
approach in future revival

6. Lack of involvement
of top management in

•

•

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process
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conceptualization (goal
setting and project
selection)

7. Lack of project
leadership skills
necessary to lead the
team
8. There are no strategies
to convince resistant
employees to maintain a
positive attitude
regarding process
improvement projects

Fursule et al.,
2012

•

Excellence Leadership Team,
supporting LSS training
Period 3 (focus on People):
Individual Process
Excellence goals and
objectives supported by
leadership

Yes

•

Period 2 (focus on People):
Hiring of significant number
of new roles, including 2
Black Belts (and Director)
for Process Excellence team

Yes (+No)

•

Period 3 (focus on Means):
Growth and evolution of LSS
culture
Opportunity to enhance LSS
change management
approach in future revival

•

9. There is not enough
time being allocated to
data and information
collection in order to
deploy tools and
techniques effectively

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

10. Lack of employee
participation and
involvement in problem
solving

TBD

•

Specific employee
participation and
involvement was not
included as part of the scope
for this study. Further
research is required.

An implementation
model does not yet exist
to guide organizations in
successfully
implementing the
methodology

Yes (+No)

•

Period 1 (Means): utilize
models from J&J (premerger) and McNeil LSS
implementations
Opportunity to enhance and
better define implementation
model in future revival

•
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Sony et al.,
2018

1. Poor success rate

2. Unrealistic
expectations from LSS

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

Yes (+No)

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Individual Process
Excellence goals and
objectives supported by
leadership
Opportunity to ensure
realistic LSS expectations in
future revival

•

3. Unsustainable results

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

4. Misuse of statistics

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

5. Large tool set

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

6. Unsupportive and
uncommitted top
management

Yes

•

Period 3 (focus on People):
Formation of Process
Excellence Leadership Team,
supporting LSS training
Period 3 (focus on People):
Individual Process
Excellence goals and
objectives supported by
leadership

•

7. Lack of training and
development

Yes

•

Period 1 (focus on People):
J&J (pre-merger) and McNeil
– significant investment in
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•

8. Lack of synergy of
LSS and business
strategy
9. Lack of link between
LSS and customer needs

Yes

•

Period 1 (focus on Means):
J&J (pre-merger) and McNeil
– decision to implement LSS
program to reduce costs

Yes (+No)

•

General (focus on
Flexibility): Adjusting
foundational processes as a
result of changes in customer
expectations
Opportunity to improve
response to changing
customer needs in future
revival

•

10. Wrong project
selection

11. Premature
discontinuation of LSS
expert

LSS training and capacity
building
Period 3 (focus on
Flexibility): Implementation
of customized Red Belt
training program

TBD

•

Specific project performance
was not included as part of
the scope for this study.
Further research is required.

No

•

Period 6 (focus on
Organization): J&J’s Process
Excellence program is
officially sunsetted

VI.2 Contributions to Theory
To understand how an enterprise organizes and manages its LSS program to successfully
sustain it over time, we applied Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s (1981) Competing Values Framework to
explore J&J’s Process Excellence lifecycle. Within each period of the lifecycle, we conducted a
deep dive analysis within each Competing Values Framework dimension (organizational focus,
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organizational structure, and organizational means and ends) to understand how J&J managed the
competing values of people versus organization, flexibility versus control, and means versus ends.
There is a dearth of literature available on the application of the Competing Values Framework to
an LSS program.
We also applied the Competing Values Framework to understand changes in competing
value focus areas over time. Table 11 below provides a visual summary of J&J’s focus on
competing values through each period of its LSS program. In terms of the organizational focus
dimension, J&J placed a stronger focus on people versus organization in the earlier periods of its
LSS lifecycle, and later shifted to organization versus people. In terms of the organizational
structure dimension, J&J placed a stronger focus on control versus flexibility throughout its entire
LSS lifecycle, with the introduction of flexibility only during the stabilization of the program. In
terms of the organizational means and ends dimension, J&J placed a stronger focus on means
versus ends in the earlier periods of its LSS lifecycle, and later shifted to ends versus means.
However, re-energized interest in LSS through J&J’s global Supply Chain Academy during the
final period shifted J&J’s focus back to means versus ends, which is a promising sign for a potential
revival of the J&J Process Excellence program.
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Table 11: J&J’s Focus on Competing Values (Visual Summary)

Application of the Competing Values Framework to the lifecycle of J&J’s LSS program
proved to be useful as it allowed us to compare and contrast the organization’s management of
competing values in a consistent manner through the various program periods. The visual mapping
of the competing value focus areas in Table 11 allows for a descriptive “competing values profile”
to be developed for each phase of J&J’s Process Excellence journey. Our study demonstrates that
application of the Competing Values Framework could be replicated to study other organizations’
LSS programs, with the potential to compare and contrast “competing values profiles” between
organizations.
Within this study, we have equated organizational effectiveness (and thus, successful
sustainment of an LSS program) with the ability to balance each set of competing values. Gulosino,
Franceschini III, and Hardman (2016: 7) state that the Competing Values Framework “emphasizes
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that the pursuit of a single criteria of organizational effectiveness is less likely to become effective
than is a broader and a more balanced approach”. Although J&J demonstrated the ability to
successfully sustain its LSS program for a period of 13 years, one might argue that the program
had now successfully run its course – and there may no longer be the same need or requirement
for the program to now be revived. One could compare J&J’s Process Excellence program lifecycle
to that of a product lifecycle, going through the typical stages of Product Development, Product
Growth, Product Maturity, and Product Decline35. That is, periods 1 and 2 of J&J’s LSS program
lifecycle could be analogous to Product Development, period 3 to Product Growth, period 4 to
Product Maturity, and periods 5 and 6 to Product Decline.
Another potential argument for J&J’s LSS program having now successfully run its course
could be the fact that the LSS methodology is now fully ingrained within J&J’s day-to-day
processes – that is, LSS is now the “way of working” for the organization. This describes the
organizational culture of enterprises who have successfully sustained LSS for a significant period
of time – such as Toyota, Motorola, GE, Ford Motor Company, Boeing, and Caterpillar – where
LSS is no longer a separate “program”, but now a part of their organizational DNA. J&J could
build on the foundational strength it has established with LSS, and introduce other methodologies
to better balance its competing values – which it is already doing with the recent application of
agile tools and methodology to introduce more flexibility into the organization’s processes.
Use of the Competing Values Framework within this study also provides us with a profile
of J&J’s management of competing values which could potentially be used as a model to evaluate
LSS sustainability in other organizations. Cameron and Quinn (2011) have developed a set of
instruments for organizations to diagnose and change organizational culture based on the

35
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organization’s “competing values profile”, as measured by its Management Skills Assessment
Instrument and Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument36 tools. The Sanger Leadership
Center at the University of Michigan has incorporated the Competing Values Framework into its
“Michigan Model of Leadership”, as it states that “navigating these fundamental tensions and
achieving the appropriate balance is the stuff of leadership”37.A similar set of instruments could
be developed for an organization to evaluate the effectiveness of its ability in sustaining its LSS
program, with tools and strategies for course correction if required.
VI.3 Contributions to Practice
Should J&J consider the potential for reviving the Process Excellence program within its
organization, the visual mapping of the competing values focus areas over time (in Table 11 above)
may be useful in identifying potential next steps. We outline recommendations below for better
balancing the competing values of people versus organization in the organizational focus
dimension, introducing more flexibility in the organizational structure dimension, and better
balancing means versus ends in the organizational means and ends dimension.
A better balance in managing the competing values of people versus organization can
potentially be attained in the approach taken for training staff members and the support provided
towards the subsequent completion of Belt projects. Although a significant emphasis was placed
on the importance of people in the earlier periods of the program (through the encouragement and
support behind Process Excellence training), less of an emphasis was placed on the follow-through
required for project completion and Belt certification. A better balance in managing people versus
organization would involve the development of clear mechanisms to fully support Belts post-

36

OCAI Online, About the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) - https://www.ocaionline.com/about-the-Organizational-Culture-Assessment-InstrumentOCAI#:~:text=The%20OCAI%20is%20a%20quick,four%20types%20of%20organizational%20culture.
37
Sanger Leadership Center, University of Michigan, What is the Michigan Model of Leadership? https://sanger.umich.edu/our-model/
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training as they work to complete their projects. J&J’s Process Excellence team had previously
facilitated regular “drop-in” sessions for Belts to bring questions and problems on their projects to
resolve – but a more prescriptive process would involve a dedicated Green Belt or Black Belt to
be assigned to each Red Belt project to provide direct consultation and guidance. Similarly, a
dedicated Black Belt or Master Black Belt would be assigned to each Green Belt project – with
active participation from Project Champions for all Belt projects. Formal milestone checkpoints38
within the appropriate forums should also be established to ensure continual progress on all Belt
projects, while driving accountability and removing potential roadblocks. Specific Process
Excellence training and project deliverables should be documented within each Belts’ individual
goals and objectives throughout the lifecycle of the LSS program, with regular check-ins
established with managers and leadership as appropriate.
To introduce more of a focus on the competing value of flexibility versus control, an
opportunity exists in improving the design of the Process Excellence training program and
certification requirements. J&J should develop a separate workstream for those staff members who
are interested in completing the training, but perhaps not interested in continuing post-training to
lead a project and/or seek Belt certification. This would eliminate the added pressure on training
participants, some of whom may simply want to learn about the LSS culture and be able to apply
the methodology and tools in their everyday work (versus taking on the significant initiative of
leading a project). Another opportunity to introduce more of a focus on flexibility versus control
would be the creation of a “Process Excellence Lite” version of the program, which would be
catered to organizational processes which may not require the stringent regulatory measures
necessary in the plant environment. That is, the “Process Excellence Lite” training program would
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include a smaller subset of tools which are most beneficial to staff members working in the office
environment (for example: Sales, Marketing, Demand Planning, Customer Service, Human
Resources, and Information Technology), and include more transactional39 (vs. manufacturing)
working examples in the training curriculum and supporting materials.
To better balance the competing values of means versus ends at the organizational level,
the push towards embracing the LSS culture should only be targeted to those departments in J&J
which are conducive to the full application of LSS methodology. Thus, instead of mandating that
all departments subscribe to LSS and strongly encouraging they each have a set of certified Red
Belts and Green Belts (as was the case during the earlier periods of J&J’s Process Excellence
lifecycle), J&J should only implement the Process Excellence program as a mandatory one in those
departments where it’s more important to have control versus flexibility as a competing value (for
example: Plant Production, Plant Processing, Quality Assurance, Engineering, Packaging,
Regulatory, and Finance). This allows each “LSS-optional” department to self-select as to whether
LSS will be the approach taken within their department (i.e. the means) to achieve their department
objectives (i.e. the ends). As demonstrated by the challenges that 3M experienced with their
implementation of Six Sigma in the early 2000s40, departments which thrive on creativity and
innovation (for example: R&D, Sales, and Marketing within J&J) should have the option of not
having to apply full-scale LSS methodology to their processes.
Leadership team members and LSS practitioners outside of J&J may also find this study to
be of value as they evaluate their own organization’s LSS program. Which competing values have
their organization been focusing on, and how can their LSS program better manage these

iSixSigma: Harvesting Value in Transactional Processes with Lean Six Sigma –
https://www.isixsigma.com/implementation/basics/harvesting-value-transactional-processes-lean-six-sigma/
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competing values to increase sustainability in its LSS program? Is their organization experiencing
challenges in LSS program sustainability which J&J’s successful approaches can perhaps be
applied to and tested on to try and resolve? For new LSS practitioners, this study provides a
window to the inner workings of a large-scale organization in its journey through LSS
implementation and sustainment, while managing competing values. Practitioners interested in
completing Belt training, working on Belt projects, and seeking Belt certification may now have a
better understanding of the value LSS brings to an organization, in addition to the personal growth
and development opportunities it brings to the practitioner. Stakeholders and other employees
within an LSS organization may also gain a better understanding of LSS culture, methodology,
and competing values – so they can fully embrace their organization’s LSS program and engage
in LSS discussions with their leaders, peers, vendors, suppliers, and customers.
VI.4 Limitations and Future Research
Although this case study design explores the LSS journey of a single organization, the
insights and detailed contextual information on J&J’s implementation and sustainment of its
Process Excellence program will bring value to leaders and practitioners of other LSS
organizations. Application of the Competing Values Framework can be replicated to study how
other LSS enterprises organize, manage, and successfully sustain their LSS programs over time.
Diagnostic instruments and tools (as proposed in the ‘Contributions to Theory’ section) could be
developed based on the replicated studies to generalize the LSS program approaches to other
organizations.
With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic during the data collection period of this study,
many of the study participants had limited time available to engage in a full-length phone/video
interview, and thus opted to complete a survey via email instead. Should additional availability
arise from these and other study participants, a more comprehensive understanding of the detailed
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events and activities within each of the Process Excellence program periods could perhaps be
obtained. Further research could also include a return to this study in 10-15 years to extend the
competing values analysis across additional periods of J&J’s LSS journey, and evaluate whether
the recommended approaches for revival of the program were successful. A deeper analysis could
be conducted on specific LSS project performance within J&J’s entire Process Excellence
lifecycle, which could then be mapped against J&J’s management of its competing values. J&J’s
LSS journey could also be explored through a different theoretical lens, such as Dynamic
Capabilities Theory, Absorptive Capacity Theory, or Sensemaking Theory.
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VII APPENDICES
Appendix A: Research Protocol
1.

Summary

This study investigates how an organization manages competing values to continuously renew
and effectively sustain its Lean Six Sigma program long-term. The study expects to produce the
following results:
1.

An analysis of Johnson & Johnson’s sustainment of its Lean Six Sigma program
through the lens of competing values

2.

Practical advice for managers to apply the learnings from Johnson & Johnson to
achieve long-term sustainment of Lean Six Sigma within their organizations

3.

Advancement of competing values theory as a framework for assessing and
guiding process improvement programs

We apply a case study methodology with targeted interviews (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña,
2014; Myers, 2013; Yin, 2014) with volunteers, who are either currently or have been previously
involved in Johnson & Johnson’s implementation of its Lean Six Sigma program. We will
conduct qualitative analyses on the collected data to fulfil the study objectives (Miles et al.,
2014; Myers, 2013; Yin, 2014).

2.

Description

2.1. Rationale: The rationale of the study is to investigate how an organization manages
competing values to continuously renew and effectively sustain its Lean Six Sigma program
long-term. Organizations are keen in implementing Lean Six Sigma programs, but the majority
experience challenges in achieving long-term sustainment and discontinue the program after a
few short years. Lean Six Sigma methodology provides a framework for managers to achieve
process improvement, but does not provide a framework for organizations to renew and
effectively sustain their Lean Six Sigma programs.
2.2. Objectives: To analyze Johnson & Johnson’s Lean Six Sigma organizational
transformation via competing values. To generate practical advice for managers to apply the
learnings from Johnson & Johnson to achieve long-term sustainment of Lean Six Sigma within
their organizations. To advance competing values theory as a framework for assessing and
guiding process improvement programs.
2.3. Methodology: A case study methodology will be used for the study (Miles et al., 2014;
Myers, 2013; Yin, 2014). Qualitative analyses on the data will be conducted to fulfill study
objectives (Miles et al., 2014; Myers, 2013; Yin, 2014).
Data Management and Analysis: Volunteers, who are either currently or previously
involved in Johnson & Johnson’s implementation of Lean Six Sigma programs. A total of
10 to 15 interviewees will be recruited for this study. Notes will be taken by the Principal
Investigator during the interview. With the interviewee’s consent, the interview will also
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be digitally audio-recorded to facilitate data collection. The interviews will be conducted
by phone. The interviews should take no more than one hour each. If necessary,
interviewees may be asked to participate in up to two follow-up interviews. Each followup interview should last no more than 30 minutes. Each interviewee’s participation in this
study will not exceed two hours.
2.4.

This study involves no compensation to the participants.

3.

Ethical Considerations

Participation in this study is voluntary. If a participant decides to participate at first but changes
his or her mind later, he or she has the right to drop out at any time. The interviewee may skip
any question in the interview or stop answering questions at any time. Whatever the decision, the
participants will not lose any benefits to which they are otherwise entitled. Participants of this
study will not have any more risk than they would face in a normal day of life.
We will keep the records of the interviewees private to the extent allowed by law. Only the
Principal Investigator will have access to the information provided. Information may also be
shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board
and the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)).
All electronic materials related to interviews (digital audio recordings, transcripts, etc.) will be
stored as password-protected files on the Principal Investigator’s computer. This computer is
protected by a username, password, and firewall. All paper documents and digital audio
recordings produced for this study will be stored for two years and then destroyed. The names
and other identifying facts of the participants will not appear when we present this study or
publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. The participants
will not be identified personally.

4.

References

Miles, M., Huberman, A.M., and Saldaña, J. 2014. Qualitative data analysis: A methods
sourcebook (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Myers, M.D. 2013. Qualitative research in business and management (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Yin, R.K. 2014. Case study research design and methods (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol (Part 1)
Interview guidelines: At the beginning of the interview, the participant will be informed about
the study purpose and be reminded not to use any names or share information that can identify
other people.
Research Question: How can an enterprise organize and manage its Lean Six Sigma program to
successfully sustain it over time?
Note: The following table represents the planned universe of questions that may be asked. Not all
of these questions are relevant for all the informants and therefore the actual questions asked
during interviews will depend on the informant’s role within the organization. Moreover, since
this study involves semi-structured interviews, other relevant questions may be generated during
the course of an interview based on the informant’s responses.
Section

Interview Questions

A. Interviewee Profile 1.
2.
3.
4.

What is your name, current title, and place of employment?
What years were you employed at J&J?
What roles or positions have you had at J&J ?
What training or certification (if any) do you have in Lean, Six
Sigma, or process improvement in general?
5. Prior to J&J, did you have any experience in Lean, Six Sigma, or
process improvement? Please describe.
6. Can you describe your involvement in J&J’s Lean Six Sigma
program, and your role as a leader, practitioner, or customer of
the program?

B. Competing Values
Focus Areas

1. People vs. Organization:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the needs of the individual vs. the needs of the
organization?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the needs of the organization vs. the needs of the
individual?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
values (i.e. people vs. organization) play into the
ongoing maintenance and sustainment of its LSS
program?
2. Flexibility vs. Control:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the need to be flexible vs. the need to maintain
control?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
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the need to maintain control vs. the need to be
flexible?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
values (i.e. flexibility vs. control) play into the ongoing
maintenance and sustainment of its LSS program?
3. Means vs. Ends:
a. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the importance of means (e.g. processes, planning, and
goal setting) vs. ends (e.g. final outcomes and
productivity)?
b. Can you share examples of how J&J has focused on
the importance of ends (e.g. final outcomes and
productivity) vs. means (e.g. processes, planning, and
goal setting)?
c. How does J&J’s management of these competing
values (i.e. means vs. ends) play into the ongoing
maintenance and sustainment of its LSS program?
C. Reflections and
Recommendations

1. In hindsight, what recommendations would you have for things
that J&J could have done differently with their Lean Six Sigma
program?
2. I understand that the Lean Six Sigma program is no longer in
existence today as a formal program at J&J. What do you think
led to this critical organizational decision?
3. What do you feel are the key success factors for J&J’s ability to
achieve long-term sustainment of its Lean Six Sigma program?
4. What recommendations do you have for other organizations who
are currently implementing or maintaining their Lean Six Sigma
program, and worried about its sustainability?
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol (Part 2)

Section

Interview Questions (Part 2)

D. Competing Values
within Process
Excellence
Timeline

1. During the implementation of the Process Excellence program at
J&J/McNeil (2002-2007):
a. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
People vs. Organization?
b. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
Flexibility vs. Control?
c. How did J&J/McNeil manage the competing values of
Means vs. Ends?
2. During the merger of J&J, McNeil, and Pfizer (2007-2008):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
3. During the stabilization of the Process Excellence program (20082011):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
4. During the move of the Process Excellence program from Corporate
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to Supply Chain (2011-2013):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
5. During the discontinuation of the Process Excellence training (20132015):
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?
6. During the discontinuation of the Process Excellence program (in
2015) and leading up to today:
a. How did J&J manage the competing values of People vs.
Organization?
b. How did J&J manage the competing values of Flexibility
vs. Control?
c. How did J&J manage the competing values of Means vs.
Ends?

Appendix D: Survey Questions
1. What do you feel are the key strengths behind the sustainment of the Process Excellence
program at J&J, and what value did it bring to you as a leader, practitioner, or stakeholder?
2. In hindsight, what recommendations would you have for things that J&J could have done
differently with the Process Excellence program?
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Appendix E: Informed Consent Form
Georgia State University
Informed Consent
Title: Sustainable Organization of a Lean Six Sigma Program: A Competing Values Analysis
Principal Investigator: Dr. Lars Mathiassen
Student Principal Investigator: Marilyn Tom

Introduction and Key Information
You are invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide if you would like to take
part in the study. The purpose of this study is to investigate how organizations manage
competing values to continuously renew and effectively sustain their Lean Six Sigma programs
long-term.
Your role in the study will last less than two hours over two months. You will be asked to do the
following: participate in an interview to be conducted over the phone or internet, asking
questions about your current or previous experience in implementing or managing Johnson &
Johnson, Inc.’s Lean Six Sigma Program. Participating in this study will not expose you to any
more risks than you would experience in a typical day. This study is not designed to benefit you.
Overall, we hope to gain information about how organizations manage competing values to
continuously renew and effectively sustain their Lean Six Sigma programs long-term.
Purpose
The purpose of the study is to investigate how organizations manage competing values to
continuously renew and effectively sustain their Lean Six Sigma programs long-term. You are
invited to take part in this research study because you are either currently or have been
previously involved in Johnson & Johnson Inc.’s implementation of its Lean Six Sigma program.
A total of 10 to 15 people will be invited to take part in this study.
Procedures
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to participate in an interview. There are no right or
wrong answers to questions asked in the interview. Please answer the questions honestly. Notes
will be taken by the Student Principal Investigator during the interview. With your consent, your
interview will also be digitally audio-recorded to facilitate data collection. The interview will be
conducted by phone or internet. The interview should take no more than one hour of your time,
to be scheduled within the next few weeks. If necessary, we may ask you to participate in up to
two follow-up interviews, with each lasting no more than 30 minutes. This study involves no
compensation to the participant.
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Future Research
Researchers will remove information that may identify you and may use your data for future
research. If we do this, we will not ask for any additional consent from you.
Risks
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. No injury
is expected from this study, but if you believe you have been harmed, contact the research team
as soon as possible. Georgia State University and the research team have not set aside funds to
compensate for any injury.
Benefits
This study is not designed to benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information about
how organizations manage competing values to continuously renew and effectively sustain their
Lean Six Sigma programs long-term.
Alternatives
The alternative to taking part in this study is to not take part in the study.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you
have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time.
You may refuse to take part in the study or stop at any time. This will not cause you to lose any
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Confidentiality
We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The following people and
entities will have access to the information you provide:
•

Principal Investigator: Dr. Lars Mathiassen

•

Student Principal Investigator: Marilyn Tom

•

GSU Institutional Review Board

•

Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)

Each interview will be assigned a random identification number. We will use this study number
rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be stored as passwordprotected files on the Student Principal Investigator’s computer. This computer is protected by a
username, password, and firewall. A code sheet that links the study number with your name will
be created and stored separately from the study data to protect your privacy. The Student
Principal Investigator will be the only person who will have access to this code sheet. All paper
documents (including the code sheet) and digital audio recordings produced for this research will
be stored for two years and then destroyed. When we present or publish the results of this study,
we will not use your name or other information that may identify you.
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Contact Information
Contact Dr. Lars Mathiassen (404-413-7855, lars.mathiassen@ceprin.org) or Marilyn Tom (470343-3835, mtom3@student.gsu.edu)
•

If you have questions about the study or your part in it

•

If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study

The IRB at Georgia State University reviews all research that involves human participants. You
can contact the IRB if you would like to speak to someone who is not involved directly with the
study. You can contact the IRB for questions, concerns, problems, information, input, or
questions about your rights as a research participant. Contact the IRB at 404-413-3500 or
irb@gsu.edu.
Consent
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign below.
Do you give consent for the researcher to audio-record the interview(s)? ____ Yes

____ No

____________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

____________________________________________

_________________

Signature of Participant

Date

_____________________________________________

_________________

Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

Date
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